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Abstract
This paper discusses the pros and cons of a single labour contract. After reviewing the
current state of dualism in labour markets and the recent labour reforms in Europe, we discuss
the various proposals to eliminate dualism. Next, we emphasise the costs of dualism and discuss
whether they would be addressed by introducing a single labour contract. We notably introduce
a distinction between reforms based on introducing a single contract with progressive seniority
rights (CPSR) or a single contract with long probation periods (CLPP). We argue that their gains
and costs are very diﬀerent, especially with regards to the stigma eﬀects and dualism. We also
consider alternative reforms: the introduction of a single labour contract as such, and alternative
reforms independent of the labour contract but addressing the issue of dualism (training, access
to housing and to credit) and compare their costs and benefits.
We then build a simple model where both temporary and permanent contracts are available to
firms. We use it to describe the demand for temporary contracts and the potential consequences
of removing them and reach the following conclusions. First, employment protection has a
moderate negative impact on employment, which can be mitigated when temporary contracts
are available. Second, the elimination of temporary contracts decreases total employment (by 7
percentage points according to our calculations). Oﬀsetting this eﬀect would require an ambitious
reform of employment protection laws of permanent contracts (in this specific setup, amounting
to a cut in layoﬀ costs by two thirds). Finally, the coexistence of temporary and permanent
contracts may also have negative eﬀects on social norms within the firm and workers’ motivation
and eliminating temporary contracts could therefore enhance productivity in this context.
∗This work was done under OECD Contract/JA 73179/. In this version, it only reflects the views of the authors
and not of the OECD. We thank, Andrea Bassanini, Clémence Berson, Alexandre Biotteau, Hervé Boulhol, Pierre
Cahuc, Stéphane Carcillo, Gilbert Cette, Juan Dolado, Nicolas Ferrari, Erwan Gautier, Paul O’Brien, Stefano
Scarpetta and Danielle Venn for useful comments. We are the only responsible for remaining errors and omissions.
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We conclude that while there are costs to dualism, these are not as obvious and well estab-
lished as the ones triggered by employment protection itself. Further, the single employment
contract may partly be a quiproquo (misunderstanding) Instead, more clarity on the objectives
of a labour reform is needed.
Resumé
Ce texte discute des avantages et des inconvénients du “contrat de travail unique”. Après une
discussion du dualisme et des réformes récentes du marché du travail en Europe, nous décrivons
les diﬀérentes propositions visant à éliminer le dualisme. Nous soulignons ensuite les coûts du
dualisme et tentons de comprendre si la création d’un contrat unique les supprimerait. Nous
introduisons notamment une distinction entre les réformes basées sur un contrat unique à droits
progressifs (CUDP, ou CPSR pour l’acronyme anglais), ou sur un contrat avec une période d’essai
allongée (CPEA ou CLPP pour l’acronyme en anglais). Les gains et les coûts sont très diﬀérents
selon l’hypothèse retenue, en particulier par rapport aux eﬀets de stigmatisation des travailleurs
et par rapport à la persistence du dualisme. Nous envisageons aussi d’autres réformes: outre
celle de l’introduction d’un contrat unique, nous discutons de diﬀérentes réformes indépendantes
du contrat de travail mais modifiant les conséquences du dualisme du marché du travail (accès
à la formation, au marché du crédit, au logement) et en comparons les coûts et avantages.
Nous élaborons ensuite un simple modèle où les contrats permanents et temporaires sont
tous deux à disposition des entreprises et coexistent en leur sein. Nous utilisons cette structure
théorique pour décrire la demande de contrats temporaires et les conséquences potentielles d’en
supprimer l’usage. Nous en concluons : premièrement, que la protection de l’emploi a un impact
négatif mais modéré sur l’emploi total, qui est précisément atténué par l’existence de contrats
temporaires; deuxièmement, que l’élimination des contrats temporaires diminue l’emploi total
(de 7 points de pourcentage selon notre modèle); pour anihiler cet eﬀet négatif, il faudrait une
réforme radicale des contrats permanents (qui dans le cas d’espèce diminuerait des deux tiers
les coûts des licenciements associés aux contrats permanents); enfin, la coexistence de contrats
temporaires et permanents peut aussi avoir des conséquences négatives au niveau des normes
sociales au sein de l’entreprise et sur la motivation des salariés; éliminer les contrats temporaires
serait alors une amélioration de la productivité des entreprises.
Nous concluons sur le fait que si les coûts du dualisme sont réels, ils sont moins évidents et
moins bien démontrés que ceux engendrés par la protection de l’emploi elle-même. De plus, le
contrat unique pourrait être en partie un quiproquo. Il serait au contraire utile de clarifier les
objectifs fondamentaux des réformes du marché du travail.
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Executive summary
This paper discusses the pros and cons of implementing a single labour contract. First, we
document the current state of labour markets in Europe, and describe the dualism of contracts.
We then highlight cross-country diﬀerences with respect to the nature of contracts and review
the recent reforms in European countries and the various proposals that attempt to eliminate
dualism.
Next, we emphasise the costs of dualism and discuss whether they could be eliminated by
a single labour contract. The various reforms are categorised depending on whether they seek
to introduce: a single contract with progressive seniority rights (CPSR), a single contract with
long probation periods (CLPP), or a combination of both. We then proceed to argue that their
benefits and drawbacks are very diﬀerent, especially with regards to stigma eﬀects and dualism.
We also discuss alternative reforms, independent of the labour contract but addressing the issue
of dualism (training, access to housing and to credit) and compare their costs and benefit. We
conclude that: i) introducing a single contract with progressive rights would still lead to inequality
in seniority rights and may not eliminate inequality in general nor strictly speaking dualism
(nonetheless it would at least eliminate the discontinuity in status); ii) removing temporary
contracts would lead to adverse employment eﬀects if permanent contracts remained unaﬀected;
iii) fighting against the exclusion of temporary workers from training and housing markets can
be done with either specific reforms of the permanent contract, or targeted reforms of training
systems, and by improving the regulation of housing markets.
Assessing more formally the pros and cons of a reform implementing a single labour contract
requires a model where firms have the possibility to use a combination of temporary and perma-
nent contracts, which may or may not coexist in equilibrium. We therefore build a simple model
where both types of jobs are available for firms. We use it to describe the determinants of the
relative demand for temporary contracts. These determinants are: i) the perceived heterogeneity
in skills which favours temporary contracts; ii) the growth rate of the economy which favours
permanent contracts; iii) business cycle volatility which favours temporary contracts; iv) firing
costs of permanent workers which raise the demand for temporary contracts and v) restrictions
to the use of temporary contracts which reduce the demand for temporary contracts. Finally,
short-run movements in total factor productivity (or of firm’s profitability) have an ambiguous
eﬀect on the share of temporary contracts: as productivity is low, firms adjust employment with
temporary contracts. Above a threshold, an improvement of total factor productivity or firms’
profitability instead raises the share of permanent employment. Therefore, the gains from a
single contract depend on a variety of factors and may be either high or low, depending on the
economic context. In particular, the gains are the lowest during recessions, and the current crisis
may not be the most suited period for eliminating temporary contracts.
We precisely use the model to assess the consequences of removing temporary contracts.
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We illustrate four ideas that have been present in the literature but rarely or insuﬃciently
acknowledged in the discussion: first, employment protection has a moderate, negative impact
on total employment; the negative impact is actually mitigated due to the existence of temporary
contracts; an elimination of temporary contracts leads instead to a drop in total employment
(by 7 percentage points according to our calculations) and would therefore require an ambitious
reform of employment protection concerning permanent contracts (reduction of layoﬀ costs by
two third); fourth, the coexistence of temporary and permanent contracts may have negative
eﬀects on norms and the workers’ morale which have until now been overlooked: employers
claim that they cannot keep the best of their temporary workers or renew their contracts if they
are in the process of terminating a fraction of their permanent workers, leading to ineﬃcient
allocation of talents when skills are heterogeneous. The elimination of temporary contracts may
therefore be productivity enhancing in this context.
We finally explore empirically the determinants of the proportion of temporary and perma-
nent workers within firms, including medium and long-term determinants. We show that lower
growth increases the demand for temporary contracts. We also find, using empirical tests, that
there are complementarities within three types of employment regulations (protection against
layoﬀs for regular jobs for both individual and collective layoﬀs, and restrictions to the use of
temporary contracts).
We conclude that while there are costs to dualism, these costs are not as obvious and well
established as the ones triggered by employment protection itself. In terms of political economy,
oﬀering workers a more generous unemployment insurance (combined with important incentives
to accept job oﬀers and better training) in exchange for reduced employment protection is a
better and more transparent way of reforming labour markets than the alternative of converging
towards a single labour contract with uncertain gains for workers.
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1 Introduction
Many recent policy debates have revolved around the idea of implementing a “single labour
contract” which consists in abolishing or limiting the coexistence of several types of contracts
(namely, permanent and temporary), sometimes described as labour market dualism. Dualism
was initially intended to describe the US labour market in the post-war period (Doeringer and
Piore, 1971): primary workers (typically male, skilled, majority) had high-wage jobs, received on-
the-job training and faced low turnover, while secondary workers (typically uneducated, females,
from a minority) earned low-wages and had high turnover rates. In the European context, dualism
describes the situation in which some workers (mostly younger workers) are under temporary
contracts and may not easily access regular employment. Temporary contracts can be either
fixed-term contracts or interim contracts which are short-term contracts between a firm and an
interim firm. Saint-Paul (1996, 2000) extensively discusses the consequences of dualism on wage
formation, human capital accumulation and the political economy of labour market reforms.1
In this paper, we discuss the pros and cons of moving towards a single labour contract,
starting from a situation where firms can use a combination of temporary and permanent con-
tracts. Then we review the legal aspects linked to the coexistence of temporary and permanent
contracts, in particular the use of temporary contracts to adjust employment in response to
cyclical fluctuations, or as a screening process (temporary contracts being assimilated to long
probationary period). This leads us to discuss and comment the November 2007 ILO decision
regarding the French ’Contrat Nouvelles Embauches’ (CNE) which served as a stepping stone
to the elimination of the contract. It also ultimately led to the decision of the French highest
judicial institution (Cour de Cassation) on July First, 20082 to render the CNE contract illegal
because the length of the probationnary period was deemed contrary to Convention 158.
We then argue that the issue of a single contract cannot be discussed without a model in
which the two types of contracts (permanent and fixed term contracts) coexist in equilibrium.3
We elaborate a model of overlapping firms living two periods, which allows us to discuss the
determinants of the number of each type of contract. The determinants are: i) the perceived
heterogeneity in skills, which favours temporary contracts; ii) the growth rate of the economy
which favours permanent contracts; iii) business cycle volatility which favours temporary con-
1Among the conclusions, one may emphasise that firing costs do increase returns to education at the cost of
excluding low-skill workers, that employment protection and dualism in contracts result in a status quo bias, and
that the extension of temporary contract may be blocked at some point by a majority of insiders.
2Arrêt de la Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, rendu le 01/07/2008, rejet (07-44124), http://www.net-
iris.fr/veille-juridique/jurisprudence/20063/la-cour-de-cassation-confirme-la-non-conformite-du-cne-a-la-
convention-de-oit.php#plan-2; ILO decision: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_norm/—
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_087583.pdf
3Wasmer (1999) provides a such a search and matching setup where the demand for temporary contracts
decreases with productivity growth and even vanishes above a threshold growth rate. A calibration establishes
that in a regime of permanent growth above 4.16% a year, there should be no demand for temporary contracts
at all.
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tracts; iv) firing costs of permanents workers which raise the demand for temporary contracts
and v) restrictions to the use of temporary contracts which reduce the demand for temporary
contracts. Finally, short-run movements in total factor productivity have an ambiguous eﬀect
on the share of temporary contracts: if productivity is low, firms adjust employment using tem-
porary contracts. Above a threshold, productivity unambiguously raises the share of permanent
employment. It follows from the analysis that the need to suppress temporary contracts depends
on the cyclical context and on economic growth and the net benefits of a single contract may vary
substantially, being lower in recessions. A recent article by Cahuc et alii. (2011) also develops a
model with the two types of contracts. The authors investigate another aspect of the trade-oﬀ
between the diﬀerent types of contracts.4 Many more studies along these lines have recently
been done.5
Next, we assess the consequences of removing temporary contracts. We illustrate some ideas
that have been present in the literature but rarely or insuﬃciently acknowledged in the discussion
surrounding the implementation of a single labour contract: first, employment protection has
a moderate negative impact on total employment which is actually smaller when temporary
contracts provide some flexibility. The elimination of temporary contracts leads to a drop in
total employment (by 7 percentage points in our quantitative exercise) and would require a very
large reform of employment protection of permanent contracts in order to compensate for the
loss of the temporary contracts as an instrument of flexibility (e.g. a decline by two third of the
cost of laying oﬀ workers).
However, the coexistence of permanent and temporary contracts may have negative eﬀects
through norms and incentives which have until now been overlooked: employers claim that they
cannot keep the best of their temporary workers or renew their contracts while laying oﬀ some of
their permanent workers, leading to ineﬃcient allocation of talents when skills are heterogeneous.
The elimination of temporary contracts may therefore be productivity enhancing in this context.
This can be rationalised either because of a morale eﬀect on other permanent workers, by the cost
of breaking implicit contracts, or because of regulations: economic layoﬀs of permanent workers
4Our work diﬀers from Cahuc et alii. (2012) in that the trade-oﬀ leading to the coexistence of temporary
and permanent workers is diﬀerent. In their work, temporary workers face higher layoﬀ costs before the end of
the temporary contracts than under permanent contracts: it may therefore sometimes be preferable to avoid a
temporary contract, even though they can be terminated at no cost at the end of the period of the contract if
needed. Their paper therefore focuses on the role of the short-run volatility of labour demand. Our work focuses
on a diﬀerent trade-oﬀ: the transformation of a temporary contract into a permanent one is subject to restrictions
due to the legal environment or due to the quit behaviour. With heterogeneous workers, it may be preferable to
oﬀer a permanent contract in order to keep the best workers. This setup allows us to address a yet unexplored
question: the additional costs or legal impossibility of laying oﬀ permanent workers not suitable for the job, when
at the same time the firm hires in temporary contracts.
5The literature on temporary contracts has flourished in Europe. A non-exhaustive list is Alonso-Borrego and
alii. (2011), Bentolila and alii. (2010), Berton and Garibaldi (2006), Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cao et alii.
(2010), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), Macho-Stadler and alii. (2011), Portugal and Vareja˜o (2009). Charlot
and Malherbet (2012) consider the role of temporary contracts on returns to education and conclude to adverse
eﬀects of dualism. The most recent calibration exercise to assess the French labour market reforms is in Berson
and Ferrari (2012).
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cannot be justified when firms simultaneously hire new workers or retain temporary workers.
The political economy of these arguments imply that permanent employees are unlikely to
accept a reform which would implement a single labour contract if it reduced their employment
security or if it raised the length of probation periods of permanent contracts. Overall, while there
are costs to dualism, these costs are not as obvious and well documented as the ones triggered
by employment protection itself. Oﬀering workers a more generous unemployment insurance
(combined with important incentives to accept job oﬀers and better training) in exchange for
reduced employment protection is a more transparent way of reforming labour markets than
converging to a single contract with uncertain gains for workers.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the various types of contracts available
in several countries. Section 3 discusses the benefits and costs of a ’single contract’ reform.
Section 4 develops a model with an endogenous share of temporary and permanent contracts. It
then investigates the role of perceived heterogeneity on the optimal mix of temporary contracts.
Section 5 assesses the impact of removing temporary contracts, on employment and on the
removal of the implicit norm associated with the coexistence of temporary workers and permanent
workers. Section 6 investigates the long-run eﬀects and notably role of growth on the optimal
mix of temporary contracts and tests theses eﬀects as well as the role of the sub-components of
employment protection. Section 7 concludes.
2 Overview: the single labour contract
2.1 “How far away are we from a single labour contract?”
2.1.1 Dualism of contracts is rooted in the law
France, Germany, Italy and Spain along with most countries of the European Union have a dual
labour market: permanent employment coexists with some form of temporary employment. In
most countries, jobs are based on written employment contracts. Jobs can be classified into two
categories: temporary and permanent. They are considered as temporary if the termination of
the employment relation is determined by objective conditions such as reaching a certain date,
completion of an assignment or return of another employee who has been temporarily replaced.
Jobs are defined as permanent (or open-ended) if there is no explicit agreement on the date of
termination. Temporary contracts are essentially divided between fixed term contracts (contracts
that directly bind the employer to the employee for a limited amount of time), agency contracts
(contracts that use employment agencies or businesses as intermediaries between the worker and
the employer: people are engaged by the employment agency and hired out to a third party to
carry out a job) and specific training contracts.
The traditional open-ended ‘permanent’ contract is the most common form of employment
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contract in the European Union (being held by around 80% of employees6). For most countries,
these types of contracts were traditionally considered as the ‘regular’ means of employment,
temporary contracts being the exception. Some countries, such as Germany, France and Spain,
attempt to limit the use of fixed term contracts. In spite of this, the proportion of workers on a
temporary contract has risen significantly over the last decades, as seen in figure 18 (in Appendix
A): the share of temporary workers in the OECD countries rose steadily by 12 percentage points
between 1985 and 2008. In Germany, France and Italy temporary workers accounted for almost
15% of the employed population in 2010 (see Figure 1). The use of temporary jobs has been
especially high in the Netherlands and in Spain: they respectively account for 18.5% and 24.9%
of the jobs7. Some countries such as the United Kingdom (6% in 2010) and Slovenia (5.7%
in 2010) have managed to maintain a lower share of temporary employment but few countries
have experienced a decrease in the share of temporary contracts in the recent years. There is
a noticeable exception: Denmark. Indeed, between 1984 and 2010, the incidence of temporary
contracts declined from 32.6% to 25.4% while it increased in almost all OECD countries (Source:
OECD 2010).
Figure 1: Proportion of employees with a contract of limited duration (% of total employees aged
15 to 64 ) in 2010
Nonetheless the exact terms of the contracts vary according to the countries in which they
are implemented. Employment protection laws are especially country-specific.
6Eurofound., «Changes over time: first findings from the 5th European Working conditions’ survey,» 2010,
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/pubdocs/2010/74/en/3/EF1074EN.pdf
7OECD (2010), "Labour Market Statistics: Employment by permanency of the job: incidence", OECD Em-
ployment and Labour Market Statistics (database).
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2.1.2 The traditional ‘Permanent Contract’
In Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and Spain and the United Kingdom permanent or ‘open-
ended ’ contracts diﬀer in terms of the national Employment Protection Laws. Spain, The Nether-
lands, Germany and France appear to have the most rigorous EPL of the group for regular contact
whereas the United Kingdom, Italy, Denmark and Finland have the more flexible EPL (see Fig-
ure 2). It seems diﬃcult to interpret the diﬀerence in EPL solely using the diﬀerences in the legal
systems: even though the United Kingdom (a common law country) has the lowest EPL as could
be expected the country with the second lowest degree of EPL is Italy (a civil law country).
Figure 2: 1998-2008 average of employment protection for regular contracts,
OECD Employment Protection Laws’ Indicators on regular or ’permanent’ contracts in diﬀerent countries (w.a.
REG). The EPL indicators for a given country and a given year are computed using the weighted average of
OECD EPL Indicators for regular contracts, indicators on collective dismissals are not taken into account in this
figure (see items 1-8: www.oecd.org/employment/protection).
Most European countries have some procedural requirements for individual dismissals and
the countries in the figure above are no exception (see Table 1). On average, Latin countries
have more requirements than Anglo-Saxon countries, but they are not necessarily the strictest in
terms of the length of notice period. Spain has a very short notice period requirement due to the
recent reforms that took place in 20108 whereas Germany has a much longer notice period that
can stretch up to 5 months if a worker has more than 10 years of tenure. The United Kingdom
appears to be the country with the most flexible requirements on average; it is also the only
common law country among the selected group. See Box 1 for a discussion of federal countries
and common law countries.
8Act 35/2010
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Box 1: some limitations of epl indicators for regular contracts
• For federal countries the EPL indicators are computed by taking the average employment protection
of the biggest states, this can give a relatively imprecise result since labour laws within a country
may vary substantially across the diﬀerent states. The United States, despite essentially relying
the ‘at will’ employment doctrine, has some employment protection guarantees (see section 3.1.1):
some come from federal laws, some from state laws and some from case laws (which can vary across
states). In Montana for instance, The Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act of 1987
(WDEA) prohibits discharge for other than good cause after a designated probationary period and
gives the employee the right to challenge a termination in court or before an arbitrator. The statute
also limits damages to up to four years of lost wages, including the value of fringe benefits, with
interests. Although similar legislation has been introduced elsewhere, Montana is so far the only
state to have passed a law with such far-reaching eﬀects.
• There is a risk that they may underestimate the rigidity of the employment protection in certain
common-law countries, especially the United States. It is indeed diﬃcult to take into account case
law, as opposed to the written laws of a country, even though the OECD indicators attempt to
reflect the former as well as the latter such as in the case of the score for reinstatement after layoﬀ
(the score is the same - 0.5 - in the United States and in France, for instance, despite very dissimilar
written laws.
• It could be interesting to include some measure of litigation costs in the EPL indicators. In
countries where wrongful termination lawsuits are very frequent and the rulings are relatively
generous towards the employees, firms may be just as limited in their termination decisions de
facto as countries with high employment protection laws. See later on the Box 6 for the costs and
delays of litigations.
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Table 1: Employment protection: strictness
Individual dismissal requirements. For the Notice Period column, ‘mw’ and ‘yrw’ are seniority indicators and
respectively correspond to “months worked” and “years worked” while ‘w’, ‘m” correspond to the duration of the
notice period, respectively “weeks” and “months”. In the case of Denmark for example a worker who has worked
for less than 6 months in a given job will have a notice period of 1 month; the notice period of a worker with
more than 6 months of work will be of 3 months; no matter the seniority of the worker, the notice period will not
exceed 6 months (ILO EPLex database).
On average, EPL in these European countries is high compared to other OECD members.
This induces a relative rigidity of the ‘permanent’ labour market: employers are limited in their
termination decisions and can bear important costs when they decide to terminate a contract.
This lack of flexibility regarding employment actions is usually given as the underlying reason for
the recent surge in temporary contracts and more specifically fixed term contracts. Employers
are less willing to hire workers under permanent contracts, because they know that if they face
adverse economic conditions in the future, it will be more costly to decrease production by laying
oﬀworkers. Anticipating a negative shock, employers might therefore prefer to oﬀer temporary
contracts that bind them to workers for a limited time, even in a more prosperous period.
The current situation of increased financial instability and insecurity might have reinforced this
phenomenon by making employers more risk averse.
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2.1.3 The most common fixed term contracts
Some countries also have rigid EPL governing temporary employment, which may have limited
the use of fixed term contracts.
In Italy, the most common fixed term contract, ‘contratto a termine’9 has a maximum du-
ration of 3 years. Workers under such contracts can either work full time or part time. The
‘contratto a termine’ can only be renewed once and the duration of the renewed contract cannot
exceed that of the original contract and the total length of employment must be inferior to 3
years. A worker engaged in such a contract benefits from the same social rights as any other
worker in accordance with the national collective contract.
In France the ‘Contrat à Durée Déterminée (CDD)’, the most common form of temporary
contract is strictly regulated by the French Labour Code. First, employers can only use a CDD
in specific situations10. A CDD can be oﬀered in the case of the replacement of a worker,
who is either absent, on leave following the suspension of his contract, on temporary part time
or who is set to arrive at a future date. This contract can also be used in the situation of
a temporary productivity increase of a firm, for seasonal jobs and for the replacement of the
head of a company11. Second, CDDs are also regulated in their duration: they cannot exceed
18 months12 and the maximum number of successive CDD that a worker can engage in is set
to two. For skilled workers, a more flexible contract was introduced in 2008 in the “Loi de
Modernisation du Travail”: in the “CDD à objet défini”, engineers and executives (“cadres” in
French) can benefit from a contract between 18 months and 36 months. However, it is important
to stress that this strict regulation of temporary contracts can be and is in practice circumvented
by some employers through more or less illegal means. For instance, in order to avoid hiring a
worker under a permanent contract, an employer can state that the task at hand is the result of
a temporary surge in productivity when in reality the job in question requires a permanent full
time worker.
In Spain there are three major fixed term contracts ‘contrato de obras y servicios’, ‘contrato
eventual ’ and ‘contrato de interenidad ’. The overall duration of temporary contracts has been
limited by law to a total of 24 months, however it appears that the law can easily be bent:
contracts for which workers have been hired to perform certain tasks or service can be extended
if it is proven that the task requires more than 24 months of labour and redefining the job has
been legally suﬃcient to circumvent the time limit. The contract ‘contrato de obras y servicios’
for which the worker is hired to undertake an autonomous and specifically delimited project
9http://www.mfe.org/index.php/Portails-Pays/Italie/Emploi-stage/Reglementation-du-travail
10Article L1242-2 du Code du Travail Modifié par Ordonnance n°2010-462 du 6 mai 2010.
11There are nine specific cases: for replacing an employee who is absent or temporarily working part time, to
transitorily replace an employee whose job is either going to be suppressed or filled by another permanent worker
and for temporary increases in the firm’s activity, seasonal activities and jobs in certain sectors (forestry, naval,
entertainment, teaching, survey-making, professional sports...).
1224 months if the contract was done abroad or in order to deliver an exceptional export order; or when the
job is suppressed and in this case an approval from the employees representatives is needed.
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or to provide service the execution of which, although limited, is of uncertain duration. The
‘contrato eventual ’ is concluded when business demands are high and resources are stretched or
when there is backlog, even though the work may be within the normal activity of the enterprise.
This specific type of fixed term contract cannot exceed 6 months within a twelve-month period.
Finally a worker can engage in a ‘contracto de interenidad ’ when he is substituting a worker
entitled to return to work after leave.
In Germany, there are two types of fixed term contracts: fixed term contracts for which ‘ob-
jective and material grounds’ are required; and fixed term contracts without objective grounds.
A fixed term contract based on ‘objective and material grounds ’ can be renewed without limita-
tion. Objective and material reasons are not required for the conclusion of a contract for a term
not exceeding 2 years. Within this time frame, the contract can be renewed 3 times13. For newly
founded enterprises, this time limit is up to 4 years. Similarly ‘objective and material’ reasons
are not required for workers aged 52 and over.
In Denmark, a fixed term contract can be concluded provided that it follows “objective criteria
such as reaching a specific date, completing a specific task or the occurrence of a specific event”14;
however, unlike France, Germany, Spain or Italy there are no limitations to the maximum number
of successive fixed term contracts (except in certain sectors such as teaching and scientific work
where they are limited to two). Apart from standard terms of notice, fixed-term workers are
generally covered by the same collective agreements and by the same legislation as permanent
employees (e.g. holidays, seniority, salary during sickness etc.). Since 2003, the law on fixed-
term contracts (Lov om Tidsbegrænsede Ansættelser which comes from the EU directive of
1999 on fixed term contracts) covers all fixed-term workers. The main objective of the law is
to improve the quality of fixed-term contracts by ensuring that fixed-term workers have the
same possibilities and rights as employees in standard contracts. Another important objective
of the law is to protect the fixed-term workers against employers’ improper use of successive
renewals. Therefore a fixed-term contract can only be renewed due to objective conditions such
as maternity leave or sickness or because a longer contract is needed in order to complete the
task.
In the United Kingdom contracts are not necessarily written, however employers are required
to send a written document to the worker after 2 months on the job (Employment Rights’ Act).
There is no limitation to the number of successive short term employments that a worker can have.
The Fixed-term Employees Regulations (FTER), in eﬀect since 2002, stipulate that a fixed-term
employee shall become a permanent employee after four years of continuous employment under
one or successive fixed-term contracts. However, this statutory four-year limit does not apply if
13 Sec. 14 (2) PTFTEA.
14Sec. 1 (4) ESEA.
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employment on a fixed-term contract can be justified on objective grounds, or if the period of
four years has been lengthened under a collective or workplace agreement. Unlike France, Spain,
Italy or Germany, there are no restrictions to the use of fixed term contracts in the United
Kingdom. In the Netherlands, similarly to the United Kingdom, there are no limitations to the
uses of fixed term contracts: no specific reasons are required. Nonetheless, fixed term contracts
are limited to 3 and cannot exceed 36 months. A fourth renewal or a renewal exceeding a total
period of 3 years will alter the fixed-term contract automatically into an open-ended contract.
The number of renewals and/or the duration can be changed by collective agreements.
Figure 3 highlights the diﬀerences in limitations to the use of fixed term contract: France
has the most limitations closely followed by Finland, Spain, Denmark and Italy while Germany
and the Netherlands are much more flexible in their use of the FTC and the United Kingdom is
the most flexible of the lot (excluding the USA as at-will employment dominates and cannot be
compared to the fixed term contracts used in the other countries). See also Boxes 2 and 3 for a
specific focus on Denmark and the Netherlands.
Figure 3: 1998-2008 average employment protection for fixed term contracts, which reflects the
stringency of restrictions against temporary/fixed term contracts (maximum duration, maximum
number of renewals and number of valid cases for use)
OECD Employment Protection Laws’ Indicators on fixed term contracts in diﬀerent countries (w.a. FTC). The
EPL indicators for a given country and a given year are computed using the weighted average (w.a.) of OECD
EPL Indicators for FTC, indicators on temporary work agency are not used in this figure (see items 10-12:
www.oecd.org/employment/protection). The 2012 reforms in Italy and Spain are discussed in Section 2.2.2.
Most OECD countries and especially those studied in this paper have legally accepted forms of
temporary employment along with permanent employment. Moreover the recent labour market
statistics suggest that countries are de facto moving further and further away from a single
labour market. Yet more and more labour market specialists are pushing for the destruction of
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the duality of the labour market through the implementation of a single labour contract.
Box 2: Focus on Denmark
(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/labref/pdf/denmark_en.pdf)
In Denmark the overall level of EPL is low. It is particularly modest for both regular contracts and fixed
term contracts (especially compared with the rest of the European Union and France in particular) while
the degree of protection regarding collective dismissals is of the same order of magnitude. Nonetheless,
the number of workers under permanent contracts remains quite high (90% of the employed population
are engaged in an open-ended contract) “The modest EPL dates back to the September Compromise of
1899, the system of unemployment benefit dates back to the late 1960s and active labour market policies
go back to the 1993-94 labour market reforms”.
The low EPL indicators stem from Denmark’s well known flexicurity system characterised by three
important pillars: “flexible contractual arrangements” (i.e. the majority of the workforce is easy to
dismiss and there are high job mobility and job turnover rates: about 25-35% of the workforce even
high-ranking employees change employers each year ), “high social protection including strong income
support” (unemployment and other social benefits) during job transitions, “strong active labour market
policies” granting rights and giving obligations for the unemployed coupled with training policies.
Existing legislation tends to apply to white-collar workers while blue-collar workers are mostly protected
through collective branch agreements. In order to dismiss a white collar worker, a written notice of
dismissal is required and must be given the first day of the month and the notice delay “counts from the
1st day of the month following the receipt of the notice”. White-collar workers can request immediate
negotiation with the union and the notice period goes from 2 weeks to 6 months depending on the length
of the job tenure. For blue-collar workers “collective agreements contain a provision for written notice
with reason for dismissal” there are also negociation provisions if the employee finds the dismissal unfair.
Dismissals will be considered as collective if the number of dismissed employees is greater than or equal to
9 for firms that have 21 to 99 workers. For companies that have 100 to 299 workers, collective dismissals
correspond to the dismissal of more than 9% of the total number of employees and for companies that
have more than 300 workers, a dismissal will be viewed as collective in nature if it reaches 29 workers or
more. In addition to individual notification the company must notify the Regional Employment Council.
An additional 30 days delay after notice is given. Firms with up to 20 employees are exempted from
requirements for collective dismissals.
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Box 3: Focus on The Netherlands
(Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/labref/pdf/netherlands_en.pdf)
The Netherlands’ EPL indicator is one of the highest in the EU for regular contracts. This is “mainly
due to high procedural inconveniences and diﬃculty of dismissals for regular contracts”. In turn, the EPL
indicator for restrictions against temporary/fixed term contracts is quite low (see figure 3). Dismissal
procedures can occur through two channels. First, in the case of a unilateral termination decision, the
private sector employer can require prior permission from the Centre for Work and Income (CWI), a
public administrative body,. This procedure acts as a “preventive check to determine the reasonableness
of any intended dismissal”. This procedure is less onerous but much longer than its alternative which
is for both employees and employers to request a local court to “dissolve the employment contract for
important reasons”. . . In the first case employers are faced with long notice periods (from one to
three months, depending on the tenure of the employee) and a more “bureaucratic and time-consuming
dismissal” procedure, the alternative route is faster, but also more expensive as firms are faced with much
higher severance pay obligations, especially for long job tenures (from 6 up to 35 months for job tenure
of 20 years).
Severance payments are tenure dependent. The trial period “– i.e. the period within which, regular
contracts are not fully covered by employment protection provisions and unfair dismissals cannot usually
be made “- is of 1 month for contracts of up to 2 years; 2 months for contract with more than 2 years
duration. The option of reinstatement is rarely made available to the employee. “Notwithstanding court
rulings, employers in practice can choose to replace reinstatement in the previous job by payment of
compensation. The amount of compensation is governed by the application of a regular severance pay
formula.” Dismissals will be considered as collective when one employer in the same region has dismissed
at least 20 workers over a period of three months. In this case, the employer must provide data on the
financial state of the company, prove that alternatives to redundancy have been considered, and justify
the selection of dismissed employees. The employer must inform and consult with work council and trade
union delegates on “alternatives to redundancy and ways to mitigate the eﬀects and notify the competent
regional employment oﬃce. A social plan will normally be agreed outlining transfers, re-training, early
retirement measures and financial compensation. While there is no legal entitlement to severance pay in
case of collective dismissal, social plans often contain severance pay or top-ups to unemployment benefits.”
2.2 How to evolve towards a single contract?
2.2.1 Proposals for eliminating dualism
There are theoretically diﬀerent ways of evolving towards a single employment labour market.
The first possibility consists in removing all forms of temporary contracts from the labour system
and keeping the traditional permanent or ‘open-ended ’ contracts as they are. This solution
requires firms to adapt their strategies. In the absence of temporary contracts, they would lose
one margin of adjustment.
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A second possibility consists in replacing all existing contracts by one single contract that
would be somewhere in between the traditional permanent contract and the fixed term contract.
The advocates of this solution are quite numerous (especially among lawyers and economists)
with two variants: some argue that this single labour contract should replace all existing forms of
employment contracts (the ‘pure’ single employment school of thought); others plead in favour of
a single labour contract only replacing the two dominant forms of contracts (fixed term contracts
and permanent contracts) without aﬀecting smaller more specific employment contracts such as
agency or interim contracts (Andrés et alii. 2009) and training contracts, the ‘extended’ single
labour contract school of thought. Among those; some plead in favour of an ‘extended trial
period’ while some others call for ‘reduced dismissal requirements’. Both should lead to greater
flexibility for employers while limiting the increase in job insecurity for workers through the
introduction of a new regulation of the labour market. For instance, in the ‘extended trial
period’ proposal, the single labour contract would have two periods: a probationary period
during which employers would be granted more flexibility in terms of dismissal requirements,
and a normal permanent period, securing workers that would otherwise have been hired under a
temporary contract.
In the ‘reduced dismissal requirements’ proposal, the idea is to extend the number of motives
for termination of the regular employment contract, and in particular incorporate the legal
justifications for the current use of fixed term contracts (such as the replacement of a worker and
seasonal activity). In other words a single labour contract could be terminated if both parties
had previously agreed upon the duration of the contract and if the reason given was legally
acceptable (Gleize, 2011, see Box 4). Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) advocate for the introduction
of a permanent contract without the collective layoﬀ regulations (e.g. the current compulsory
redeployment requirements). Redeployment of the fired workers would be the responsibility
of the public employment service, not the firm. In compensation, firms would have to pay a
‘termination tax ’. Interim contracts would still exist to give companies the necessary leeway to
handle job turnover.
The single labour contract would include severance pay - a transfer to workers - that increases
with seniority to all new hires (Andrés et alii, 2009). Generally speaking, the main logic of
employment protection is to compensate workers for specialising in skills that are specific to the
firm or the occupation. Since this specialisation increases with seniority, severance payments
should also increase with seniority. We discuss this specific point in the conclusion.
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Box 4: A Permanent Contract For All?a.
Céline Gleize advocates the destruction of temporary contracts. A more flexible form of the CDI would
unilaterally replace them. It would include a new legal motive for termination that would correspond de
facto to the reasons for which a company might favour a fixed term contract (replacement of a worker
on leave, temporary increase in productivity, seasonal activity. . . ). Nonetheless, to protect workers, in
order to terminate a contract using the same legal motives as the current CDD, employers would need
to follow the same termination requirements as those required by law for the dismissal of a permanent
worker (letter of notice, preliminary meeting with the employer...). The termination of the contract
would also necessarily give right to a job insecurity allowance (“prime de précarité”) equal to 20% of
the wages perceived by the worker since the beginning of the contract. In order to encourage employers
to keep the ex ‘fixed term’ worker, the new permanent contract would be made less rigid. Both parts
could renegotiate this new CDI regarding decisions that were made at the branch level, thus limiting the
rigidity of the old CDI (it cannot be renegotiated) while still protecting the worker as some aspects of
the initial contract would remain intangible (such as the fixed portion of the wage). Therefore the new
permanent contract would be composed of a rigid, intangible part (the core agreements of the contract)
and a modifiable part that could be re-negociated after the initial contract was signed.
aCeline Gleize, «Un CDI pour tous», Etudes, Institut Montaigne (2011)
2.2.2 Implementation: the history of recent experiences
With the persistence of high unemployment rates, more and more countries have implemented
reforms to induce more flexibility in their permanent contracts.15 These could be associated as
first steps in the process towards the implementation of a single labour contract.
In August 2005, the French government introduced a new employment contract named “Con-
trat Nouvelle Embauche” (CNE) for workers hired by companies of at most 20 workers. This
contract, although open-ended, gave employers more leeway, in terms of termination decisions,
for the first couple of years than the traditional permanent contract. During the first two years
that followed the signing of the contract, employers were not required to justify their termination
decisions and workers could decide to quit their job without being required to give notice. In the
case of termination of the contract the reform stipulated that the worker be granted a severance
payment equal to 8% of the salary earned since the beginning of the contract. Following the
CNE reform, the French government also passed the ‘first employment contract’ (CPE) reform
15In theory, a greater flexibility in contracts eases hires, with ambiguous eﬀects of total employment but positive
eﬀects of employment of women. See e.g. Di Tella and Mc Culloch (2005). There is also evidence on a negative
eﬀect of EPL on productivity (see Bassanini et alii. 2012 for a systematic exploration using a Rajan-Zingales
identification strategy). There is also some evidence of an ambiguous eﬀect of EPL on the capital labour ratio: the
eﬀect may be positive for low values of EPL and negative at higher values (see the references and some theoretical
background in Janiak and Wasmer 2012). EPL may finally have a positive eﬀect of specific skills investments
(Wasmer 2006).
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in April 2006, this reform sought to generalise the CNE reform so that it could be used by
companies of 20 or more employees to hire workers under the age of 26. However, both reforms
were overturned: the CNE for legal reasons (see subsection 2.2.3) and the CPE after protests
and fierce opposition by employees’ unions. in March 2006.
In Italy, in February 2012, the government launched a reform in order to curb the duality
of the labour market. The first part of the reform was aimed at rationalising the diﬀerent
types of employment contracts: the forty diﬀerent types of legal employment contracts will be
brought down to eight. The second part of the reform focused on the implementation of a new
open-ended contract that would replace the current permanent contract. This new contract
would have a three-year trial period during which employers would have the right to terminate
the contract. However, following these three years, employers would be required to employ the
workers permanently. The reform was adopted in July 2012 although some aspects have now
been abandoned. The reform adopted instead focusses on extending the maximum duration of
temporary contracts (up to 36 months) but makes them more costly16, favours apprenticeship for
young workers while providing incentives for confirming the apprentices into permanent contracts,
and slighly eases firing restrictions in large and medium sized firms.
The Spanish government proposed in March 2012 a drastic reform of the labour market to
reduce the duality of the Spanish labour market by introducing more flexibility in the permanent
contract while limiting the use of temporary contracts. The reform creates a new open-ended
contract for small and medium companies (less than 50 workers) and independent workers. This
contract has the particularity of having a probationary period of one year. Employers using this
contract would also benefit from tax breaks if they hired either workers below the age of 30 or
workers having faced a long registered unemployment spell. The reform also clarified the legal
clauses under which ‘termination for economic reasons’ could be used to reduce red tape costs
and is considered as a reduction in the cost of employment protection17. Finally it restricted the
use of fixed term contracts, limiting their maximum duration to 24 months.
Several countries have undergone reforms to reduce the duality of the labour market. Most
of these reforms aim at tackling the rigidity of the traditional permanent contract, making it
more flexible and giving more leeway to employers in terms of termination decisions. However,
it is not suﬃcient that these reforms be backed politically. They must also comply with the legal
norms of each country.
16It introduced a supplementary social contribution on temporary contracts, reimbursed if the contract is
transformed into a permanent one within six months. http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9ab9c7b6-
ba7b-4b3e-8a75-cae72bdad0aa.
17http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/04/23/the-reform-of-the-spanish-labour-market-is-politically-costly-
and-will-only-bring-minor-economic-changes/
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2.2.3 Legal obstacles
International barriers
In 1985, the ILO Termination of Employment Convention also known as Convention 158 came
into force; 34 countries, among which very few Western European countries (Finland, France,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Luxembourg), have ratified it18. This convention that aims at
insuring a certain degree of employment security can be considered as an important barrier to
the implementation of a single labour contract, as it compels the ratifying countries to follow a
number of employment protection clauses. Article 4 of the convention, considered as “the corner-
stone of the Convention’s provisions”19 establishes the need to base termination of employment
on a ‘valid’ reason. It requires that the reason given be connected with either the capacity of
the worker, the conduct of the worker or the operational requirements of the undertaking, estab-
lishment or service. Article 11 of the convention provides that, unless an employee is guilty of
serious misconduct, a worker whose employment is terminated shall be entitled to a “reasonable
period of notice, or compensation in lieu thereof ” 20. The Convention serves to lay out standards
of procedural fairness in cases of termination of employment and therefore includes procedures
to be applied prior to or at the time of termination (article 7 ), procedures of appeal against
termination (articles 8 and 9 ) and procedures regarding workers’ entitlements upon termination
(article 12 ). The Convention also establishes supplementary provisions to be applied in respect
to termination of employment for economic, technological, structural or similar reasons (articles
13 and 14 ).
The convention 158 provides some prohibitions. Article 5 gives a non-exhaustive list of
reasons which would not constitute a valid reason for termination such as union membership,
seeking oﬃce as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of a worker’s representative, the filing
of a complaint against an employer, race, colour, sex and absence from work during maternity
leave. Article 6 provides that a “temporary absence from work because of illness or injury shall
not constitute a valid reason for termination”21.
18The complete list of countries that have ratified the convention is: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Brazil, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Gabon, Latvia, Lesotho, Luxembourg, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi,
Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, Saint Lucia, Ser-
bia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen and
Zambia.
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ILO, «Note on Convention n°158 and Recommendation n°166 » 2009,
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf
20
ILO, «Note on Convention n°158 and Recommendation n°166»
21see http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convdf.pl?C158
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Nonetheless, the Convention 158 allows for a certain degree of flexibility to the ratifying
states as to the manner in which the obligations are implemented at the national level. Article
1 states that “the provisions of the Convention shall, in so far as they are not otherwise made
eﬀective by means of collective agreements, arbitration awards or court decisions or in such other
manner as may be consistent with national practice, be given eﬀect by laws”22. Article 2 also
gives some leeway to states as it oﬀers them the option of excluding certain types of category
of workers on the basis of the nature of the contract of employment (workers engaged under a
contract of employment for a specified period of time or a specified task, workers serving a period
of probation or a qualifying period of employment, determined in advance and of a reasonable
duration and workers engaged on a casual basis for a short period) or the category of workers
concerned.
The Convention compels ratifying states to follow a certain number of rules in terms of
employment protection and in that sense it may, in some cases, be in contradiction with the
implementation of a single labour contract. This is especially the case when the single labour
contract is viewed as a more flexible (with regards to termination clauses) permanent contract. If
article 2 is insuﬃcient to allow a ratifying country of implementing a new contract then member
states may denounce the convention. A denunciation is possible only at certain times (usually
during one year within a ten year interval). Brazil is the only country to have denounced Conven-
tion 158 (in 1996). The Government of Brazil stated that it had taken the decision to denounce
the Convention due to legal and economic complexities unforeseen at the time of the ratification.
It argued that the convention could on the one hand be “invoked to justify excessive and indis-
criminate dismissals”23due to the vagueness of article 4 or on the other hand “give way to broad
prohibition of dismissals” which would not be compatible with the program of economic social
reform and modernisation in force at the time. Moreover the Brazilian government stressed the
fact that the convention constituted a “step back in the course towards less state intervention and
more collective bargaining”24. In February 2008, President Lula da Silva submitted Convention
No. 158 to the National Congress for ratification. In July 2008, the Foreign Aﬀairs Committee
of the National Congress voted against ratification. The issue was forwarded for examination by
the Labour Committee of the National Congress.
National factors and risk of the status quo
International conventions are not the only form of legal barriers to the implementation of a
single labour contract. The national labour codes of a country can also limit or even prevent the
introduction of new employment contracts.
22see http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convdf.pl?C158
23Report of the committee of experts on the application of Conventions and REcommendations, Report III,
Part 1A, 85th Session 1997, ILO, Geneva.
24Report of the committee of experts on the application of Conventions and REcommendations, Report III,
Part 1A, 85th Session 1997, ILO, Geneva.
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In countries such as France, Germany, Spain and Italy, the labour codes expressively state
the conditions in which a temporary contract can be used. Some of these rules are more rigid
than others. In France for example a fixed term contract can only be used in specific cases as
discussed above. Therefore, the single labour contract requires both a change in the regulation
of temporary contract (with a broader use of such a contract) and possibly (see the discussion
in next Section) an important reform of employment protection of temporary contract, requiring
deep modifications of the French ‘Code du Travail’. Likewise in Spain a fixed term contract
can only be used for objective reasons (specific work, accumulation of tasks, replacement...), for
training, to hire disabled workers and to cover the part of the working day left uncovered by an
employee close to retirement.
Moreover, the national labour codes can also be very rigid in terms of procedures related
to the termination of a permanent employment contract. This can also be a barrier, especially
when most single labour contracts described in theory require more flexible termination clauses.
In France for example individual and collective dismissals are highly protected by the law. There
are only two legally accepted forms of individual dismissals: dismissal for personal motive and
dismissal for economic motives. Dismissal for personal motive must be based on a precise, serious
and verifiable oﬀense, which must be important enough to justify termination of the employment
contract. Dismissal for economic motives must rely on causes that are not linked to the workers.
In both cases, the employer is also bound by a series of procedural rules such as receiving
the worker for a preliminary discussion on the matter, sending the notification letter, notifying
the administration (in the case of an economic based termination), considering alternatives to
dismissal (transfers, retraining...) and finally giving priority rules for re-employment. Collective
dismissals are assimilated to dismissals for economic reasons: if dismissals are collective, they are
necessarily economic. The French labour Code distinguishes two types of collective dismissals:
those concerning less than 10 employees over a 30-day period25, those concerning 10 or more
employees over a 30-day period26 both require the following of a very consequent termination
procedure on the part of the employer. The latter must consult with trade union’s prior to the
dismissal, must notify the public administration and the worker’s representatives; he must get
the approval of the administration, consider the worker’s condition when making the dismissal
decision (family responsibilities, length of service, social considerations and skills), and in firms
above 50 employees, consider alternatives to dismissal (general retraining and redeployment
obligation stated in the mandatory “employment safeguard plan”); and must give priority to
these workers in the case of a re-employment decision. The requirements for dismissals are
relatively similar in Italy and Spain especially regarding collective dismissals. In Italy however the
employer does not need the approval by the public administration or the worker’s representatives.
In Spain the ’Worker’s Statute’ and the ‘Labour Procedure Law’ do not give priority rules for
25art. L 1233-8 to L 1233-10
26art. L 1233-28 to L 1233-33 LC
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re-employment.
In Appendix C, we further develop the experience of the French reform of the Contrat Nouvelle
Embauche (CNE) of 2005, as an illustration of the legal diﬃculties associated with labour reforms.
3 Is it really worth all the trouble? The economic and social costs
of dualism
In this Section, we review the arguments in favour of a single labour contract. We dissociate
the issue of eliminating (or making more costly) temporary contracts and issues of reforming
regular contracts, in particular reducing the degree of employment protection of such contract. In
particular, we will discuss whether dualism has high costs compared to the costs of employment
protection, and whether these costs are due, more simply, to high employment protection of
permanent contracts independently of the existence of non-standard forms of employment.
This issue of the multiplicity of the targets addressed by the single labour contract has
sometimes generated doubts about its necessity. In the specific context of France where labour
market dualism is relatively more important than in other European countries, Barthélémy et
alii. (2006) argued that fixed duration contracts are a way for firms to adjust to their economic
environment. Independently of the cost of layoﬀs for permanent contracts, there is a demand for
temporary contracts. The demand for labour is volatile and various contractual arrangements
are a way for the firm to adjust. Note however that a single employment contract would not
prevent adjustment either; it is simply an independent issue. As put - rather ironically- by the
authors, there are also many contractual arrangements in business life, many types of firms and
no demand of a simplification and convergence to a single type of firm. The authors therefore
claimed in their conclusion that “The single contract is orthogonal to the solutions needed to adapt
and improve French labour laws.” We will list here some of the potential arguments in favour
and against the single contract. The main arguments in favour of a single employment contract
are centred on the existence of large costs of dualism, which is the coexistence of temporary and
permanent contracts. In this Section, we review the potential costs of dualism and discuss them.
The main message of this Section is that the replacement of permanent and temporary contracts
by a new contract may eliminate some costs of dualism but not all.
The previous Section has shown that the diﬀerent proposals in favour of a single labour
contract have several dimensions. One is whether the reform fully eliminates the temporary
contracts or not. A second one is the extent to which the regular contract is deeply modified or
not. In particular, some of the reforms involve contracts with (continuous) progressive seniority
rights (CPSR); while some of the reforms involve contracts with large probationary periods
(CLPP); both aspects may finally be combined to various extent.
In particular, under both CPSR and CLPP, workers with low seniority and low protection
would still coexist with workers with high seniority and more protection. The CPSR will eliminate
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discontinuities in the degree of employment protection, may or may not reduce the stigma eﬀect
associated with being in a temporary contract, and finally change workers’ expectations about
their own employment perspectives. Indeed, both a temporary contract and a single labour
contract with low protection under low seniority play the same role: they allow the firm to respond
to temporary labour demand conditions and screen workers. Under a temporary contract, the
default is non-renewal and workers under such contracts will undertake some eﬀort to find another
job. Under a single employment contract, the default is renewal, leading to a negative surprise
(misperception) for newly hired workers and possibly litigations and appeal. The CLPP will
not eliminate discontinuities, workers laid-oﬀ within the extended probation period, will still
suﬀer from stigmas, with or without change on worker’s misperceptions (depending on how they
perceive the role of the probation period), and will help employers screen workers. It will however
not reduce dualism.
3.1 Dualism is often considered to increase inequality among workers
Regardless of the composition of the labour force, the fracture between temporary and perma-
nent contracts necessarily creates a divide in the labour market. Having two distinct forms of
employment (one much more favourable than the other) makes visible the existence of duality
in the labour market. It also gives employers the tools to legally discriminate between diﬀerent
groups of workers based on demographics or skills. Workers with permanent jobs develop stable
working habits, their wages are relatively high27, and they are highly protected in the case of a
dismissal.
In other words, permanent jobs bear many similarities to what the dual labour market theory
semantics call ‘primary jobs’ (Doeringer and Piore, 1971, Reich, Gordon and Edwards, 1973).
Workers with temporary contracts, like those in ‘secondary jobs’, have lower wages, experience
higher turnover rates and very little career advancement. The diﬀerential in contractual forms
triggers a legal gap in terms of employment conditions and is thus a factor of inequality among
workers. The type of contract determines the expected duration of employment spells and in
particular the layoﬀ probability in an economic downturn (Cahuc and Kramarz, 2004). Workers
with a permanent contract, regardless of their individual characteristics or productivity levels,
are much more likely to remain employed than temporary workers, as employers will choose not
to renew temporary contracts when facing a bad shock.
However, the existence of unequal access to stable jobs is not a specificity of the coexistence
of several types of contracts. The coexistence of several contracts makes dualism more visible
and the fact that these contracts stem from written laws would act like an implicit approval of
dualism by the governments and thus roots dualism at the core of the labour market of countries
in which these contracts co-exist. In the United States where dualism in contracts historically
27The theory of compensating diﬀerentials predicts that, everything else controlled for and notably productivity,
their wage should be lower given greater employment stability.
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did not exist, a large amount of empirical studies shed light on persistent divisions by race, sex,
educational credentials, industry grouping and so forth (for an old literature, see Harrison 1972,
Nackenoﬀ 1983, Hudson 2007) among US workers. These groups “seem to operate in diﬀerent
labour markets, with diﬀerent working conditions, diﬀerent promotional opportunities, diﬀerent
wages and diﬀerent market institutions”. (Reigh, Gordon and Edwards, 1973).
A question is therefore to try and understand whether the elimination of temporary contracts
is enough to reduce the turnover of young workers with low seniority rights in a temporary
contract, and whether some categories of workers (unskilled, youngsters, women) may get access
to high seniority even after the removal of all temporary contracts. To the best of our knowledge,
this still has to be demonstrated. A few reasons for doubting about the elimination of dualism
with single contracts are developed below.
The existence of high EPL in permanent contracts aﬀects productivity negatively and slows
down employment reallocation, as argued before. Therefore, we must also question whether the
single labour contract is the best way to reform employment protection of regular contracts.
3.1.1 The particular case of ‘at-will’ employment contracts
In the United States, ‘at-will’ is the only form of employment; yet segmentation of the labour
force remains. Indeed, contrary to most OECD countries and especially those of civil law descent
there are no diﬀerentiated legal forms of employment that keep the fracture between temporary
and permanent employment open. Employment relationships are presumed to be ‘at-will ’ in
all U.S. states except Montana. At-will means that an employer can terminate an employee at
any time for any reason, except an illegal one, or for no reason, without incurring legal liability.
Likewise, an employee is free to leave a job at any time for any or no reason with no adverse
legal consequences. Moreover, in an at-will relationship, the employer can change the terms of
the employment relationship with no notice and no consequences. “In its unadulterated form,
the United States’ at-will rule leaves employees vulnerable to arbitrary and sudden dismissal, a
limited or on-call work schedule depending on the employer’s needs, and unannounced cuts in pay
and benefits.28”. See Box 5.
This system is the same for everyone, it does not favour one part of the labour market more
than another per se and all the workers are governed by the same rules. At first glance it would
seem that the US ‘at-will’ specificity corresponds to a situation of total job insecurity for everyone.
There are however, some means of employment protection which protect all workers, known
as “at-will exceptions” which have gained importance over the years: common law exceptions
and statutory exceptions (Auto, Donahue and Schwab, 2007). This system can therefore be
assimilated to a form of single employment strategy in which all workers face in principle the
same amount of job insecurity. Yet de facto, the US labour market, very much like the European
28Source: National Conference of State Legislatures, «The at will presumption and exceptions,» 2012,
<http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/at-will-employment-overview.aspx>.
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labour market remains fragmented, especially given the widespread use of seniority rules. See
Box 6.
Box 5: ‘at-will’ exceptions
There are common law exceptions to the at-will presumption that have been made by the courts and that
mitigate its consequences. The most widely recognised common law exception to the at-will presumption
protects employees against adverse employment actions that violate a public interest. The public policy
exception is comprised of four categories: refusing to perform an act that the state law prohibits, reporting
a violation of the law, engaging in acts that are in the public interest, exercising a statutory right. Another
largely accepted exception to the at will presumption is the implied contract exception: “an agreement
‘implied in fact’ founded upon a meeting of minds, which, although not embodied in an express contract, is
inferred, as a fact, from conduct of the parties showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their
tacit understandinga ”. A minority of states recognise an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationships. Judicial interpretations of this covenant have varied from requiring just cause
for termination to prohibiting terminations made in bad faith or motivated by malice. Employees can
also use promissory estoppel (“the employer made a clear and unambiguous promise of employment, the
employee relied on the promise, the employee’s reliance was reasonable and foreseeable and the employee
was injured as a result” b) and tort-based claims (Intentional interference with a contract and Intentional
infliction of emotional distress) to fight their employers’ decision of firing them. However, these last two
exceptions are much harder to prove and courts are much less responsive to them.
Finally there are also statutory exceptions to the at-will employment presumption. Federal and state
discrimination statutes protect employees from adverse employment actions based on their race, color,
religion, sex (ex: Equal pay Act of 1963), national origin, age (ex: Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967), disability (ex: American with Disability Act of 1990), or veteran status. Federal and/or state
laws prohibit employers from firing employees in retaliation for engaging in legally proper, necessary,
or desirable activities such as claiming minimum wage or overtime compensation, engaging in union
activities, opposing unlawful discriminatory practices, filing for workers’ compensation, and “whistle-
blowing”.
aBaltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States - 261 U.S. 592 (1923)
bSource: National Conference of State Legislatures, «The at will presumption and exceptions,» 2012,
<http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/at-will-employment-overview.aspx>.
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Box 6: Comparisons on Employment Litigations
It is diﬃcult to get an idea of the costs triggered by wrongful termination lawsuits, as there are very few statistics
available. Computing a coherent approximation of such costs would require statistics on the average legal fees
(lawyers, consulting firms. . . ), on the average duration of the trial, on the likelihood of getting charged and on
the amount of the punitive damages incurred by the employer. In the United States, there are no statistics
on the total employment cases. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) which monitors the
charges of employment discrimination and resolution under several statutes revealed that in 2011, there were a
total of 99 947a individual charge filings. The number of total individual charge filings has increased by more
than 20% over the last ten years. The Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report of 2011 reports that
the continued economic challenges and low hiring rates during 2010 fueled more class action and collective action
litigation. Most significantly, the plaintiﬀs’ bar increased the pace of collective action filings under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) seeking recovery for unpaid work time and overtime wages. These conditions spawned more
employment-related case filings, both by laid-oﬀ workers and government enforcement attorneys. The amounts
awarded to the plaintiﬀs in employment trials in the United States vary. According to the EEOC, the monetary
benefits recovered out of the 300 suits filed in the federal district courts in 2011 amounted to 91 million dollars.
The monetary benefits, or punitive damages, awarded to the plaintiﬀs in class action suits can be extremely
high: the Velez, et al. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. case led to a settlement of 175 million dollarsb on
behalf of the company. In France, in 2010 there were a total of 217 128 employment litigation casesc that
were brought to trial. Approximately 70%d of these cases concerned unfair individual dismissal charges. Among
these filed charges, 172 044 followed the main procedure (“au fond”) and 45 084 were conducted under interim
relief procedures (“en référé”). In 2010, the average trial for an employment case lasted 11.1 months. It can be
longer: 13.7 months for regular procedures (procedures au fond) or faster: 2 months for interim relief procedures
(procedures en référé). 25% of the cases that were resolved in 2010 lasted less than 2.5 months and 50% lasted
less than 9 months. In 2004, the decisions that were based on the demand of the plaintiﬀ accounted for 51.2% of
all employment litigations and among them 37.7% ruled in favour of the employee. There are no statistics on the
costs incurred by the employers. Reinstatement due to unfair dismissal is quite limited in practice and limited
by law to a few specific cases such as violation of the basic rights (union membership, discrimination, etc.)e. In
2004, it was estimated by the ministry of justice that only 2.5% of employees fired for economic reasons went to
trial to challenge the decision while 25.8% of employees fired for personal reasons went to trialf. In Denmark,
Collective Agreements regulate the mediations for non-discriminatory wrongful dismissal complaints. For the
other employment litigations linked to unfair dismissals, a specific dismissal tribunal with lay or professional
judges is needed. The employer faces the burden of proof and no court charges are involved. The length of the
trial is 9 months for blue-collar workers and 12 months for white-collar workers. If the dismissal is judged unfair,
reinstatement orders are possible but rare. Compensation is more common. It is however limited to 52 weeks of
pay for blue-collar workers and in the case of long service (the average is 10.5 weeks pay). For white collar workers
compensation increases with age and tenure: 9 months if more than 20 years tenure and maximum 6 months if
more than 30 years of age and 15 years of tenure.
ahttp://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
bGerald L. Maatman, «Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report,» 2011
chttp://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q13/13-97924QE.htm
dBrigitte Munoz Perez et Evelyne Serverin, «le droit du travail en perspective contentieuse,» 2005
e“La nullité du licenciement est prononcée en cas de violation d’une disposition protectrice du Code du travail (licen-
ciement d’une femme enceinte, d’un accidenté du travail, d’un représentant du personnel) ou d’une liberté fondamentale
(non-discrimination, droit de grève, victimes ou témoins de harcèlement moral ou sexuel). Source: La réintégration d’un
salarié dont le licenciement est annulé par les juges - Editions Tissot
fBrigitte Munoz Perez et Evelyne Serverin, Le droit du travail en perspective contentieuse 2005
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3.1.2 Under dualism, workers may receive too little training
Another form of inequality is unequal access to training. Firms train workers when they expect
to benefit from productivity gains not matched by equivalent increase in wages. Training is more
likely to be paid by firms when it provides skills specific to the firm, (Wasmer 2006) or in labour
markets with frictions where rents are shared between employers and employees (Acemoglu and
Pischke 1999). A prerequisite is that employment relationships last long enough to compensate
for the costs of training.
It has been shown that workers under temporary contracts are typically not trained: employ-
ers do not expect to transform the temporary contract into a permanent one. However, workers
under probationary periods in a CLPP will not benefit from more training under the current
incentive system of training. Workers in a CPSR may have better access to training, but this
remains to be demonstrated.
This can be treated under a reform not aﬀecting the types of contracts: for instance, Lemoine
and Wasmer (2010) proposed for France to simply change the incentive system for firms: if
payroll taxes or layoﬀs costs were lower for firms training more workers, including workers in
temporary contracts, this would eﬀectively reduce the proportion of untrained workers. It is easy
to implement such a system, although it is not without potential perverse eﬀects, such as firms
hiring workers and training them only to reduce their payroll costs. The reforms of incentives to
train can be made in combination with reforms of labour contracts, or independently of such a
reform.
3.1.3 Dualism leads to unequal access to housing and credit markets
Another component of dualism is that working under a temporary contract may limit access to
housing and loans (Cahuc and Kramarz 2004) in some countries such as France, Italy or Spain.
It is much more diﬃcult for a worker who does not have a permanent contract to get access
to housing. Banks are less willing to grant temporary workers a loan in order to buy a house
and landlords favour workers with permanent contracts making it more diﬃcult for a temporary
worker to rent a house or an apartment. For instance, Cahuc and Kramarz (2004, pp. 21-23)
report that in France, young workers (between 20 and 35) are 4 to 8 percentage points more likely
to live on their own and not with their family when they have a permanent contract as opposed
to a temporary contract. At all ages above 30, there is a 10 to 15 percentage point diﬀerence in
the home ownership rate between the two types of contracts, the rate being higher for permanent
workers. Therefore, the wedge between these two types of workers may be exacerbated due to
the legal distinction between contracts.
In this case, contracts with large probation periods may not help much, as banks and landlords
will still discriminate against workers under probation. A worker with low seniority rights under
a CPSR may be discriminated less by banks and landlords. Alternative reforms may be more
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specifically addressing discrimination in rental and credit markets. In particular, the rental
housing market is known to be heavily regulated (Djankov et alii. 2003). Partial deregulation
has been argued to generate strong potential gains.
3.2 Dualism generates high employment volatility
In economic booms, the existence of two separate forms of employment (temporary and perma-
nent) generates strong job creations, even if they are mainly concentrated in low productivity
firms. The wage evidence used in Blanchard and Landier (2002) suggests that lower costs on
fixed-term contracts induces firms to design routine, low productivity jobs, which they can fill
through the use of fixed-term contracts. In recessions, this duality exacerbates job destruction
(Andres et alii. 2009). This is due to the fact that the existing regulations force firms to respond
to economic fluctuations through labour turnover instead of using alternative methods such as
making changes in the workplace organisation. Indeed, a huge gap between the low (and some-
times nonexistent) severance pay for fixed term contracts and the high protection level of the
current permanent contracts induces excessive turnover. Bentolila et alii. (2010) give some evi-
dence of this phenomenon as they find that the larger gap between the dismissal costs of workers
with permanent and temporary contracts in Spain as compared to France is responsible for the
much higher unemployment rate in Spain. Introducing parameters corresponding to the French
EPL to the Spanish model of employment, they find that the unemployment rate following the
crisis would have been 45% less important than the observed one.
The current dissociation between fixed term contracts and permanent contracts was meant
to grant firms more flexibility, as they would be able to adapt their labour force more rapidly to
the economic situation. However, as put in Blanchard and Landier (2002), the excess turnover
induced by the “forced coexistence of fixed term and regular contracts can be high enough to oﬀset
the eﬃciency gains of improved flexibility”.
However, the argument presented in the previous sub-section carries through. There is con-
siderable heterogeneity in the labour market turnover rate even with a single labour contract.
Hall (1982) showed that US workers had a very high turnover rate at the start of their careers
and then settled into jobs that lasted for a very long time. The fragmentation of the US labour
market therefore bears many similarities with the more visible segmentation of the European
labour markets. In both cases, the same groups (the young, the lower-qualified and the seniors)
experience greater job insecurity: characterised by lower wages and higher turnovers.
One of the arguments in favour of a single labour contract is that workers under temporary
contracts are not oﬀered permanent contracts at the end of their current job. This may however
simply be due to the fact that permanent contracts are not attractive enough from the employers’
side, pointing out to the reform of permanent contracts. The elimination of temporary contracts
may simply discourage employers from taking risks with new workers, in the absence of an
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additional reform of permanent contracts. The key issue, addressed in the theory section, is to
compare two labour markets: one in which fixed and permanent contracts coexist and where
fixed term contracts are sometimes transformed into permanent contracts at the end of the fixed
term contract; and an alternative labour market in which temporary contracts are eliminated
and replaced with contracts with progressive rights, and verify the extent to which low seniority
workers in such contracts are laid-oﬀ or not. In the theory section we will attempt to compare
the two situations.
3.3 Dualism and workers’ screening under asymmetric information
The previous discussion points out to the role of screening and unobserved heterogeneity between
workers. In particular, temporary contracts often serve as a screening tool with some negative
consequences.
Implementing the single labour contract advocated by the ‘pure’ employment contract school
of thought (replacing all non-standard contracts and the permanent contract by a single labour
contract) whether it be using the idea of the decreased dismissal requirements sub-school or the
‘prolonged trial period’ sub-school may result in a similar situation to the one that exists in a
dual labour market. The relatively long probationary period of a single labour contract could
be used by employers as a form of temporary employment. During this period, the dismissal
requirements are reduced, and the employer facing some risk of being hit by a bad shock in
the next period may decide to dismiss all the workers before they reach the end of the period.
Likewise, incorporating new legal motives to the old permanent contract that would de facto
correspond to the legal motives for using a fixed term contract may not induce much change to
the current situation in which both temporary and permanent contracts exist. Employers would
have one tool instead of two but the duality of the labour market would most likely remain. The
single labour contract is indeed not meant to eliminate inequality.
3.3.1 Temporary contracts may generate abuses
In France for example some employers engage in fixed term contracts without valid motives when
the length of the trial period of permanent jobs is too short (2 months for employees, 3 months
for technicians, 4 months for an executive), or because the branch agreements do not allow the
renewal of the contract. Some employers, especially in the restaurant industry, use what is known
as “extra-contracts”: contracts that are not written and give no motives to justify their limited
duration (Gleize, 2011).
The overuse of temporary contracts is therefore a screening strategy, due to the perceived
diﬃculty of employers to dismiss their workers after a few months under a regular contract. It
may be due to regular contracts having too high protection, although most regular contracts
already have low protection for workers of low seniority levels. Another possibility is that the
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social norm does not allow workers hired under a regular contract to be fired except for cause,
and that “insuﬃcient skills or eﬀort” is not considered as a valid cause.
This is an important discussion, unfortunately lacking evidence: de facto in many countries,
permanent contract are not associated with strong EPL at low seniority: yet employers are re-
luctant to hire workers, especially young workers with no employment experience. Addressing
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper but this certainly deserves some more work. The
question is therefore whether a contract with progressive rights would fully ease the hiring pro-
cess, that is, eliminate such a norm. However, its proponents rarely insist on the fact that the
new contract would facilitate the screening of workers and mitigate the norm against laying-oﬀ
permanent workers under low seniority with insuﬃcient skills or making low eﬀort. For the norm
to evolve, this aspect of the debate must become more central in the discussions. A contract
with an extended probationary period would instead eliminate the norm. It would not eliminate
the other costs of dualism pointed out above.
3.3.2 Workers may face stigma eﬀects from being trapped between diﬀerent tem-
porary contracts
Applicants, previously employed under temporary contract, may be discriminated against: em-
ployers may presume that their previous, temporary contract, was not transformed into a per-
manent one as a result of poor motivation or a lack of skills.. However, the fact that many
temporary contracts expire for legitimate reasons beyond workers’ characteristics mitigate this
eﬀect. This is notably the case when the renewal of the temporary contract is prevented by law
or when the firm has good reasons not to oﬀer a regular contract (insuﬃcient demand in the
medium term, excessive protection of permanent contracts). Instead, a worker under a Contract
with Progressive Seniority Rights (CPSR) or with Long Probation Periods (CLPP), if laid-oﬀ
under this new contract, would necessarily send a negative signal in the absence of objective
reasons: the termination of such a contract would be due to workers’ eﬀects such as lack of skill
or motivation with certainty, not to firms’ eﬀects or the formal impossibility to go on with the
contract.
3.3.3 Complexity and discontinuity arguments
An argument sometimes heard is that a single labour contract will reduce the complexity in
the menu of contracts for employers. This is true only if it really replaces temporary contracts
instead of creating a new one. A similar argument applies in the housing and credit market: if
economic agents (such as tenants, landlords, banks, applicants for a mortgage) rightly perceive
the risks of layoﬀs for a worker with a given seniority in a CPSR contract, the single contract
will indeed reduce the complexity of the perception of the labour market status of the applicants.
This may not be the case, though. As argued above, even workers themselves may misperceive
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their expected time horison in the firm.
Finally, CPSR contract are thought by its proponents as a way to reduce discontinuities in
employment protection. If the new contract carefully avoids probation periods, this will indeed be
the case, yet at the cost of having workers with low seniority and low protection being sometimes
laid-oﬀ and thus with possible misperception and stigma eﬀects as discussed previously.
3.4 Other costs employment protection that a single labour contract would
not eliminate
In the absence of a major revision of the legal environment and the legal practices relative to
individual and collective layoﬀs, several features associated with employment protection would
most likely remain after the implementation of a single labour contract. We list here the most
important positive and negative features that would remain.
1. A recurrent complaint of employers and of employees is the uncertainty and length of
layoﬀ procedures imposed by employment protection especially in the case of litigation. In
France, most litigation cases concern individual layoﬀs (70%, see the box) and last more
than a year. See the box for a discussion of three countries the United States, France and
Denmark. See Box 629.
2. Employment protection generally has distortive eﬀects on capital accumulation and misal-
location of productive units leading to lower productivity. Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993)
and Bertola (1994) find that productivity is lower because of a misallocation of employ-
ment in technologies, favouring less productive structures, leading to reduced incentives
for capital accumulation. Bassanini et alii. (2009) empirically document the link between
employment protection and productivity growth and find that EPL reduce productivity
growth in industries where EPL are more likely to be binding. Cingano et al. (2010) find
a negative eﬀect on capital per worker in the case of European firms. On the other hand,
Autor et al. (2007) find that the eﬀect may be positive in the United States: the authors
use the adoption of wrongful-discharge protections by U.S. state courts from the late 70s
to the late 90s to evaluate the link between dismissal costs and other economic variables.
3. Fear of layoﬀ: Postel-Vinay and Saint-Martin (2005), Clark and Postel-Vinay (2009), and
Deloﬀre et Rioux (2004) showed that employees perceived their job to be less secure in
countries with stronger employment protection using the European Community Panel sur-
vey data.
4. Stress and EPL: Lepage-Saucier and Wasmer (2012) find that a higher degree of EPL gen-
erally leads to a higher degree of stress across OECD countries as well as within provinces.
29This does not necessarily means that the total number of workers in a litigation procedure regarding to
collective layoﬀs is small since by definition collective layoﬀs cover a large number of workers.
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The theoretical mechanisms are numerous.
(a) Restrictions to layoﬀ imply higher quasi-rent associated with holding a job: the risk of a layoﬀ
is lower but the associated loss is higher
(b) Lower labour turnover leads to a “mismatch eﬀect” leading to potential job dissatisfaction.
(c) Layoﬀ is a disciplinary device for workers (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). If layoﬀs are too
costly, firms may need to increase workers’ monitoring or psychological pressure to ensure an
adequate level of eﬀort from them (“psychological pressure eﬀect”).
(d) In economically non-viable jobs, with costly economic layoﬀs: firms may want to layoﬀ for
cause and thereby obtain dismissals at a lower cost ( “harassment eﬀect”) or may induce quits
(“bullying eﬀect”).
(e) Eﬀects on hours: adjustments occur more at the intensive margin (hours per worker) rather
than at the extensive margin (employment), see Lepage-Saucier (2010) for this overtime and
“workload eﬀect”.
3.5 Partial conclusion: the costs of a single contract reform, the benefits of
simpler, partial reforms
A first conclusion is that a single contract reform leading to elimination of temporary contract
(the idea of the ‘extended’ single employment school of thought, replacing fixed duration contracts
and permanent contract by a single labour contract) may lead to alternative forms of dualism,
such as the risk of a surge in agency contracts or training/apprenticeship contracts in order to
cope with their context of volatile and low demand. Therefore the risk is of shifting from one
specific type of dual market, in which workers are separated between those employed under fixed
term contracts and those employed under permanent contracts, to a dual market of workers
under agency contracts and workers under single labour contracts. The name of the contracts
would change but the situation is likely to be very similar.
A second conclusion is the diﬃculties of the political economy of the single labour contract.
The discussion of this Section clearly points to one important dimension of the single contract:
it does not necessarily aim at reducing the costs associated with dualism, but rather at starting
a discussion between representatives of employers and employees at the country level to reduce
the degree of protection of permanent contract. This is why the phrasing ‘single labour contract’
may fundamentally reflect both a quid pro quo (an exchange of something against something
else understood by the parties) and a quiproquo (a real misunderstanding): perceived as the
dismantlement of temporary contracts with no other change in flexibility by some, and instead
as a way to reform the permanent contract with increased flexibility by others. The political
economy of moving to a single contract may therefore be rapidly blocked, as a political consensus
for status quo would be highly likely: unions may not accept lower EPL in exchange for a
reduction in the number of temporary contracts, while employers may not want to suppress
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temporary contracts if the usual costs of employment protection, notably legal uncertainty, do
not disappear with the new contract. We will however see in Section 4 that a more subtle
interpretation of the political economy of single contracts may be given.
One may argue that advertising labour market reforms with the proposal of a “single labour
contract” is a smart way of insisting on the need of convergence between diﬀerent types of
labour contracts. The removal of temporary contracts may indeed appear a prima facie as a
costless solution for permanent employees. However, the costs of dualism are far less documented
and are probably much less important than the costs of employment protection as such. The
proponents of a ‘single labour contract’ want an important reform of permanent contracts, with
more flexibility. For that, the single contract oﬀers in exchange the disappearance of temporary
contracts, and often require in exchange an extended probation period. Since fixed duration
contracts are fairly well protected as emphasised in Cahuc et alii. (2012), it is hard to believe
that unions would favour this solution.
A third conclusion is that partial reforms may eﬃciently address some of the costs of dualism.
Reforms regarding rental housing markets may improve the access to housing for workers under
low seniority rights or temporary contracts. Training reforms may raise the access to training for
workers under low seniority rights. Finally, since proponents of a single labour contract propose
to generalise severance payments that would increase with seniority in the current job, this can
be done without removing temporary contracts, by simply adapting the existing contracts to this
logic. It must also be noted that conditioning social rights to seniority within the current firms
reduces incentives to professional mobility, just as rent controls reduce geographical mobility.
One may think instead of severance payments and other social rights that would increase with
seniority in the career, not in the current firm (Lemoine and Wasmer, 2010).
4 A simple model of workers’ heterogeneity and the demand for
temporary contracts
In this Section, we will take stock of the descriptive evidence of previous Section and analyse
the intuitions more formally. For that, we develop a simple and stylised setup where both types
of contracts may be oﬀered to applicants and investigate the role of employment protection,
heterogeneity of skills and finally aggregate productivity in the incidence of each type of contract.
The model is used first to analyse the eﬀective layoﬀ costs as a function, not only of the legal
environment. Next we consider the eﬀect of suppressing temporary employment, and also the
role of the coexistence of permanent and temporary workers.
The key trade-oﬀ between permanent and temporary contracts in the following model is
inspired by the debates summarised in the previous Section. The branches of the trade-oﬀ are
that i) temporary contracts act as an extended probation period allowing firms to discover the
productivity of their new employees; but ii) permanent contracts oﬀer, through protection of
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the workers, additional benefits to the firms: by reducing turnover, firms do not have to replace
their workers as often and save on hiring and training costs. By increasing the time horison of
their workers, they raise their investment in the firm, including specific skills (Wasmer 2006).
By oﬀering an implicit contract of stability, they may raise eﬀort through reciprocity.
It is important to keep in mind that our model will allow several interesting extreme cases:
either a world with only permanent workers (when the demand for temporary contracts vanishes),
or only temporary workers (when firing costs in permanent contracts are removed). In the latter
case however, this is not equivalent to a single contract, as the firm faces additional costs due as
explained above to higher turnover and lower productivity.
4.1 Setup
Both worker and firm live two periods. We think of the model as an overlapping generation of
firms, so that in the steady-state, total employment is simply a weighted average of employment
in each period. At the beginning of the first period, a mass of workers applies to the firm.
The firm has a linear technology and only hires workers when their expected value (taking into
account the layoﬀ costs associated with the contract and the turnover) exceeds the cost of hiring.
All workers start with the same productivity during an initial period (called period 1 here-
after) which has value V0. Subsequently, their productivity diverges. Based on the perception the
firm has from the worker, the firm forms a subjective probability distribution of the future pro-
ductivity of the worker after the initial period. On the basis of the distribution, the firm decides
i) to reject the application, ii) oﬀer a temporary contract iii) or oﬀer a permanent contract.
The actual productivity will be revealed after one period, which is also the length of a
temporary contract. Hence, the trade-oﬀ is the following:
• A worker in a permanent contract may quit the firm with low probability qP but it is more
costly for the firm to layoﬀ if his productivity turns out to be low. The cost is denoted by
F and is proxied by the OECD EPL index on regular contracts.
• A worker in a temporary contract may quit the firm before the term of the initial contract
with a probability qT> qP . This means that with probability (1 − qT ) the firm has to be
separated from the worker, even if it would prefer to keep it. An alternative interpretation
is that legal restrictions prevent from renewing the temporary contract. In this case, it
can be proxied by the OECD EPL index on temporary contracts. Separation, in any
event, is costless: it is suﬃcient not to renew the temporary contract.30
30Alternative branches of the trade-oﬀ between temporary and permanent contracts are that temporary con-
tracts are associated with underinvestment in training (Lemoine and Wasmer 2010, lower TFP (Dolado, Ortigueira
and Stucchi, 2012), lower eﬀort or higher diﬃculty to layoﬀ before the end of the duration of the contract (Cahuc
et alii. 2011).
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• The value of the contract must exceed the cost of hiring the worker, denoted by H. H has
several components, including training. A component of H, especially for a small business,
is the setup costs of firms, proxied by the OECD index of setup costs. In particular,
H > V0, since the firm would otherwise hire automatically every worker.
In our 2 period setting, once the productivity is revealed, if the worker has a suﬃciently high
productivity, (s)he is never laid oﬀ subsequently. We later show that our findings are also robust
to allowing an infinite number of periods.
Denote by y the marginal productivity of a worker; g￿(y˜) the subjective density of the pro-
ductivity y˜ over a finite support (y, y) where ￿ is a parameter of the distribution of worker’s
skills, reflecting the probability of having low productivity; w the wage (assumed to be exoge-
nous to start with); VP (￿) the expected value of a worker under a permanent contract; VT (￿)
the expected value of a worker under a temporary contract. We have:
VP (￿) = V0 + (1− qP )
ˆ y
y
Max(y˜ − w;−F )dG￿(y˜)
VT (￿) = V0 + (1− qT )
ˆ y
y
Max(y˜ − w; 0)dG￿(y˜)
We are going to show that according to the type of distribution they expect, firms either oﬀer
a temporary contract, a permanent contract or no contract at all:
ˆ y
y
Max(y˜ − w;−F )dG￿(y˜) =
ˆ y
R(F )
(y˜ − w)dG￿(y˜)− F.G￿(R(F ))
where R(F ) is the reservation productivity cut-oﬀ and is equal to w−F . Further, an integration
by part leads to:
ˆ y
R(F )
(y˜ − w)dG￿(y˜)− F.G￿(R(F )) = (y − w)−
ˆ y
R(F )
G￿(y˜)dy˜ − (1−G￿(R(F ))− F.G￿(R(F ))
= (y − w)−
ˆ y
R(F )
G￿(y˜)dy˜
which leads straight way to
VP (￿) = V0 + (1− qP )
￿
(y − w)−
ˆ y
w−F
G￿(y˜)dy˜
￿
VT (￿) = V0 + (1− qT )
￿
(y − w)−
ˆ y
w
G￿(y˜)dy˜
￿
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4.2 Reservation strategies and subjective perceptions by firms
It is clear from the equations above that layoﬀ costs F reduce the value of a permanent contract.
They also reduce the cut-oﬀ value of productivity and hence reduce the productivity of permanent
workers given that they are not being fired. An increase in the upper value of the support y, at
a fix G, raises the value of both hires, as does as a decrease in the wage w.
There are therefore three possible cases for a given prior distribution G:
1. VP (￿) > Max(VT (￿) , H) in which case the firm oﬀers a permanent contract
2. VT (￿) > Max(VP (￿) , H) in which case the firm oﬀers a temporary contract
3. H > Max(VP (￿) , VT (￿)) in which case the firm does not oﬀer any contract.
Interestingly, this depends mostly on the comparison between the integral of the cumulated
distribution function
´
G￿ and the parameter values: the support of the distribution y˜, the wage
w, the quit rates qP and qT and the firing costs F .
A generic situation would be for the firm to compare the mean of the distribution and its
variance, as illustrated in Figure 4. For common distributions, such as normal or uniform, we
should expect a trade-oﬀ for both VP (￿) and VT (￿) between variance and mean, reflected in
negatively sloped indiﬀerence curves for the value of each contract in the variance/mean space.
However, it is not true in the case of a generic distribution, even unimodal ones. It can be
shown that a change in the mean or the variance can either increase or decrease the value of
VP (￿) or VT (￿). It can also be shown that the probabilities of quit qP and qT have no impact on
the slopes of VT (￿) = H and VP (￿) = H. Finally, the slope of H = VP (￿) should be generally
bounded between the slope of H = VT (￿) and infinity. However, to go further, we need to impose
functional forms on the distribution of productivities g(y).
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Figure 4: Indiﬀerence curves of the firm between the diﬀerent contract types with qP ≡ 0, but
with other parameters taking various values: qT > 0 or qT = 0,F = 0 or F > 0 or F =∞
4.3 Example: a uniform distribution
To further simplify , let us start from a uniform distribution, and denote by ￿ a distribution
parameter such that y = (1 − ￿)y. Hence, ￿ characterises both the higher risk and the lower
expected productivity of a worker type.
g(y˜) =
1
￿.y
G(y˜) = min
￿
1;max
￿
0; 1− y − y˜
￿.y
￿￿
= 1− y − y˜
￿.y
for y in((1− ￿)y, y)
Further, a firm will make perceptions about the parameter ￿: for a given worker type, e.g. a
worker with experience, it anticipates a low ￿, that is a low-risk, high-productivity worker. For
another type, e.g. a young workers, it anticipates a higher ￿, that is lower productivity and a
higher risk. Therefore, our specification features quite well the main dimension of dualism, which
is age or experience.
Finally, the firm receives the application in a pool of applications for which there is an ex-ante
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distribution of the ￿. To simplify, we also postulate a uniform distribution of the ￿’s, that is a
uniform of the uniform distributions. Since we need negative values for productivity, ￿ has to be
larger than y = 1 and hence we assumed ￿ ∼ U(0, 2].
4.3.1 The eﬀect of worker’s heterogeneity on the demand for temporary contracts
Let us start in fixing a value for ￿. According to the cut-oﬀ values for the firm’s decisions to
keep workers, it is easy to compute the expected ratio of workers kept in the firm after the
productivity has been revealed, for each distribution parameter ￿. Recall that ￿ is a parameter
that characterises the spread between the maximum value and the minimum value.The actual
values of VP (￿) and VT (￿) with a uniform distribution are:
VP (￿) = V0 + (1− qP )min
￿
y − w − ￿y
2
;
(y − w + F )2
2￿y
− F
￿
VT (￿) = V0 + (1− qT )min
￿
y − w − ￿y
2
;
(y − w)2
2￿y
￿
where y−w− ￿y2 is the second period expected value of profits from workers with low-valued
￿ that have a 100% chance of being kept in the second period. Both values are shown in figure 5,
where we use the values y = 1, w = 0.5, qP = 0, qT = 0.2, F = 0.05, ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0. We can
clearly see that for workers with the lowest values of ￿ (highest expected productivity and lowest
risk), the likelihood that they will have to be fired at the end of the first period is low and the
firm will attribute a permanent contract. For a higher ￿, the firm will opt for temporary contracts
that can be allowed to expire without firing costs in the case of low productivity. Finally, for
very high ￿, the expected value of either contract is not worth the hiring cost H.
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y = 1, w = 0.5, qP = 0, qT = 0.2, F = 0.05, V0 = 0
Figure 5: Expected value of worker and expected % of workers kept according to ￿ and the type
of contract
4.3.2 The positive eﬀect of EPL on the demand for temporary contracts (new hires
and stocks)
The next step is to investigate, over the distribution of the pool of applicants, that is, on average
over the diﬀerent possible ￿ ∼ U(0, 2], how many contracts of each type are initially oﬀered, and,
at the end of the first period, how many of them are laid-oﬀ or preserved and how many quit.
We proceed as follows. We first vary the two main institutional features of the model, namely
layoﬀ costs on regular contracts F and restrictions to the use of temporary contracts qT . Figure
6 shows, for various layoﬀ costs F and depending on the value of the risk associated with each
workers ￿ from low (top) to high (bottom):
1. the fraction of workers who receive a permanent contract and are kept after the revelation
of idiosyncratic productivity (light green)
2. the fraction of workers who receive a permanent contract and are subsequently laid-oﬀ
(darker green)
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3. the fraction of workers who receive a temporary contract and are kept/transformed after
the revelation of idiosyncratic productivity (light blue)
4. the fraction of workers who receive a temporary contract and are subsequently not renewed
(darker blue)
5. the (fix) fraction of workers who receive a temporary contract and quit or are not trans-
formed due to legal reasons (purple)31
6. the rejected applications because they are too risky (dark grey).
As layoﬀs costs of regular contracts increase, the fraction of layoﬀs under permanent contracts
decreases, and even reaches zero as F approaches 0.15, since it is no longer profitable to pay
the layoﬀ cost even for the lowest productivity workers. However, a higher F also leads to a
substitution from permanent to temporary workers: the fraction of temporary workers increases,
as well as the total number of non-renewed temporary contracts. Finally, given that the tem-
porary contracts serve as a buﬀer, the number of rejected applications is invariant in F . Total
employment is invariant here.32
31Formally, the quitters are taken randomly from the distribution of temporary contracts and are therefore
not particularly associated with higher ￿ as the figure would wrongly suggest, but they are placed here is for
convenience of the representation. The same is true for layoﬀs in each type of contract: they are only more likely
to occur when ￿ is higher.
32In a more sophisticated version of the model with search frictions, however, this would no longer be true: the
higher inflows into unemployment due to a higher fraction of temporary workers would contribute to unemploy-
ment. We do not pursue this here, as our focus is on the hiring decisions of firms and the relative demand of
temporary contracts.
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y = 1, w = 0.5, H = 0.06, qP = 0, qT = 0.2, F ∈ [0.03, 0.2], ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 6: Impact of layoﬀ costs F on contracts ratios
Figure 7 represents the role of the restrictions on the renewal of temporary contracts, fea-
tured by qT , also interpretable as the quit rate of temporary workers. Intuitively, a higher qT
discourages firms from hiring temporary workers: the surface of the blue area (number of tem-
porary contracts) decreases as qT goes up. In turn, the number of rejections also goes up . As
qT increases, the firm prefers to hire ever riskier workers in temporary contracts, but also end
up dismissing a greater share of them.
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y = 1, w = 0.5,qP = 0, H = 0.06, F = 0.05, qT ∈ [0.05, 0.33], ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 7: Impact of parameter qT (quit rate or non-transformation rate of temp. contracts) on
contracts ratios
The two previous charts provide the proportions of oﬀers and rejections reported to the total
number of applications. It is also interesting to compute two derived statistics: first, the fraction
of temporary contracts among all hires, that is, the incidence of temporary contracts. Second, the
fraction of temporary contracts in the stock of employees. These two statistics obviously diﬀer
given that temporary contracts end more frequently and the reservation threshold of productivity
is also higher for temporary contracts. From the model, we calculate this share in the steady-state
as the fraction of surviving temporary contracts reported to the number of surviving permanent
contracts. Figure 8 indicates that the fraction of temporary contracts increases with the firing
costs F both in the stock and in the inflows to employment and that higher restrictions on
temporary contracts or higher quits of temporary workers (that is, higher qT ) reduce this rate.
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y = 1, w = 0.5, qP = 0,H = 0.06, F ∈ [0.03, 0.2] (and qT = 0.2), qT ∈ [0.05, 0.33](and
F = 0.05), ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 8: Stocks of temporary contracts (blue curve) and inflows/incidence (red curve) of tem-
porary contracts a a function of layoﬀ costs F and restrictions qT to temporary contracts
4.3.3 The ambiguous eﬀect of the business cycle on the demand for temporary
contracts
Next, we investigate the eﬀects of the aggregate productivity, featured by a diﬀerent distribu-
tion of productivities. When we vary the upper limit of productivity y, the whole support of
productivities ((1− ￿)y, y) shifts up, while keeping constant the value of the relative dispersion
of productivities ￿. Figure 9 shows the impact of aggregate productivity y on contract types.
Both types of employment increase with productivity, as they both become more profitable.
Interestingly, the fraction of temporary workers seems to increase first, and then decrease, as
productivity becomes so high that no applicants are rejected by the firm and the risk associated
with hiring a worker ends up decreasing. This can be seen on Figure 10: as long as y is below
1, a higher value of productivity leads to an increase in the share of temporary contracts: firms
adjust employment cautiously and the incidence of temporary contracts increases faster than the
incidence of permanent contracts. The reverse occurs as productivity is suﬃciently high and the
incidence of temporary contracts decreases as they are substituted with permanent contracts.
The latter situation can easily be interpreted as circumstances when labour market tightness
is high and firms have a hard time filling vacancies, even when oﬀering permanent positions to
low-qualified applicants.
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y ∈ [0.8, 1.2], w = 0.5, H = 0.06, q = 0.2, F = 0.05, ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 9: Impact of aggregate productivity y on contracts ratios
y = 1, w = 0.5, H = 0.06,qP = 0, F = 0.05, y ∈ [0.8, 1.2], ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 10: Stocks of temporary contracts (blue curve) and inflows/incidence (red curve) of
temporary contracts as a function of aggregate productivity y
The explanation of this reversal can be better understood from Figure 11. It first shows
how an increase in the general level of productivity y makes permanent contracts and temporary
contracts more attractive for lower values of ￿. Second, for the whole range of perceived risks ￿,
a higher value of y leads to higher values of both permanent and temporary contracts (resp. VP
and VT ). These two curves however have diﬀerent slopes and react diﬀerently to changes in y.
For some range of y, the value of VT increases faster than VP and for some range of y, the opposite
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holds. Therefore, the intersection between the two curves may shift left or right depending on
these relative shifts, leading either to lower or higher relative demand for temporary contracts.
y ∈ {1, 1.2}, w = 0.5,qP = 0, qT = 0.2, F = 0.05, V0 = 0
Figure 11: Impact of y on the firm’s choice of contract
The next exercise is to discuss the eﬀect of the business cycle volatility. For that, we slightly
modify the initial set-up. We imagine that beyond idiosyncratic productivity uncertainty featured
by the random variable y˜ in the uniform distribution ((1 − ￿)y, y), there is an additional layer
of aggregate uncertainty: for instance, the firm now has a probability 1-pm of 50% chance of
facing a high distribution of productivities featured by y + δ and a probability pm of 50% of
facing y− δ. In other words, the distribution in which the productivities are drawn is now either
((1 − ￿)(y + δ), y + δ) or ((1 − ￿)(y − δ, y − δ). In each case, the layoﬀ decisions would diﬀer
but permanent workers are more costly to layoﬀ and therefore more risky in bad times; on the
contrary, temporary contracts are more risky in good times, as they may quit too frequently
relative to permanent contracts. The firm anticipates this ex-ante and adjusts labour demand,
as reported in Figure 12 which varies δ in fixing y. Hiring decisions are the same in the left panel
(where δ adds up to y in good times) and in the right panel (where δ is subtracted from y in
bad times). However the ex-post structure of employment diﬀers as layoﬀ decisions occur after
the state of the business cycle is revealed. Overall, the figure shows that higher uncertainty has
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almost no impact on the demand for permanent workers, but it allows the firm to take more
risk in hiring more temporary contracts. Those workers’ application would otherwise have been
turned down. In downturns, the firm simply lets expire more temporary contracts. Although not
shown explicitly, we can compute that on average, uncertainty will slightly decrease the number of
permanent contracts, slightly increase the number of temporary contracts, and slightly decrease
the total number of workers.
y = 1, δ ∈ [0, 0.3], w = 0.5, qP = 0,H = 0.06, qT = 0.2, F = 0.05, ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 12: Impact of the volatility of the business cycle (variance of y) on contracts ratios
This Figure represents the fraction of hires and ex-post employment of temporary workers.
5 Assessing the costs and benefits of removing temporary con-
tracts
In this section, we analyse the role of the elimination of temporary contracts. In the first subsec-
tion, we simply simulate and compare two labour markets modelled in the previous section, one
in which the two types coexist, one in which only permanent contract coexist. The comparison
is clearly in favour of the dual labour market model. In the second subsection, we give a chance
to the elimination of temporary contracts, in giving it a role to aﬀect social norms related to
layoﬀs and show that this leads to an interesting insight: it may raise the eﬃciency of firms to
the extent that they can improve their screening of workers.
49
5.1 Removing temporary contracts reduces employment
Figure 13 represents the role of employment protection in the two diﬀerent worlds. Starting
(from the right) from a large level of employment protection (say, F=0.06), the employment
rate (averaging up the first and second employment period , which is interpreting the model
as reflecting an overlapping generation of two-periods firms) is approximately 76%. The model
delivers the following predictions:
1. Removing temporary contracts leads to a 7 percentage point drop in employment at a
constant level of employment protection for regular contracts.
2. Reducing employment protection raises employment in both worlds; it is faster in the
absence of temporary contracts.
3. When the cost of layoﬀs in permanent contracts F reaches a value of a third of its initial
value, the level of employment is equal to the initial value (76%).
4. At this level of F , keeping temporary contracts marginally raises employment.
This simulation illustrates three ideas that have been present in the literature but rarely or
insuﬃciently acknowledged in the discussions on reforms: first, employment protection has a
moderate, negative impact on employment; the impact is actually greater when there is no
flexibility allowed by temporary contracts; a elimination of temporary contracts requires a very
large reform concerning employment protection of permanent contracts.
Figures 14 and 15 illustrate how these conclusions are reached. Starting from the high value
of employment protection, a decrease in F leads to a decrease in temporary contracts, but also, at
the same time, at the other side of the coin: more workers under permanent contracts are laid-oﬀ,
but also, more and more permanent contracts are oﬀered to start with. Above a threshold around
F = 0.02, temporary contracts are no longer needed and only permanent contracts exist. Finally,
the net employment eﬀects are positive. The number of rejected applications also decrease when
F decreases. For a low enough F , all applications are accepted as the risk of hiring becomes
smaller than the gains. In the absence of temporary contracts (Figure 15), the same logic applies
and employment increases up as firms take more hiring risks (from the right to the left again) to
the point where all applications lead to employment.
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y = 1, δ ∈ [0, 0.3], w = 0.5, qP = 0,H = 0.06, qT = 0.2, F = 0.05, ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 13: The employment eﬀects of firing costs F under a dual labor market and under a single
employment world
y = 1, δ ∈ [0, 0.3], w = 0.5, qP = 0,H = 0.06, qT = 0.2, F = 0.05, ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 14: The reform of firing costs F under a dual labor market
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y = 1, δ ∈ [0, 0.3], w = 0.5, qP = 0,H = 0.06, qT = 0.2, F = 0.05, ￿ ∈= (0, 2], V0 = 0
Figure 15: The reform of firing costs F under a single contract
5.2 The role of social norms with and without temporary contracts
A forgotten argument in favour of the single contract is that layoﬀ costs may actually increase
with dualism. Indeed, the structure of layoﬀ costs is complex. Abowd and Kramarz (2003) and
more recently Kramarz and Michaud (2010) argue that this structure is non-linear in the total
number of layoﬀs. As put by the latter authors, “Our estimates show that collective terminations
are much more expensive than individual terminations: legislation, namely the requirement to
set up a “social plan” in case of collective terminations, magnifies firing costs. Collective termi-
nations entail very large fixed costs. Termination costs are essentially linear in the number of
terminated workers, with collective terminations being much more expensive.”
This would suggest that the total cost of layoﬀs for economic reasons is piece-wise linear, with
an increase in the slope above the threshold of collective layoﬀs (10 employees in France). In this
Section, we further argue that this cost can be larger when firms simultaneously layoﬀ permanent
workers and keep temporary workers. Indeed, firms laying oﬀ permanent workers while keeping
a fraction of temporary workers may break down the implicit contract with permanent workers,
which may reduce their level of eﬀort; employment protection may even prevent this: priority
may be given to reducing the number of temporary workers (a last in, first out clause).
This phenomenon is interesting to develop further. Ignoring it may lead to underestimate the
employment protection costs for firms and more generally the costs of dualism; the coexistence of
temporary employment and permanent employment in firms may lead to additional ineﬃciencies:
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firms might lay oﬀ “good” temporary workers and not be able to lay oﬀ workers in permanent
contracts that have a low productivity .
As a matter of fact, this mechanism allows us to understand the origin of a recent proposal
put forward by the French National Association of Human Resources Managers (ANDRH). The
proposal was simply to remove temporary contracts, without changing the costs of layoﬀs under
permanent contracts. The exact wording of the proposal can be found in Appendix D. A prima
facie, this may seem to be a surprising proposition for an employers’ association. Eliminating
one margin of decision (oﬀering a temporary contract) without aﬀecting the formal layoﬀ cost
F is similar to reducing the amount of choice given to the firm, without any compensation. The
President of the ANDRH, questioned on this apparent paradox in an audition at the French
Economic, Social and Environmental Council (Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental,
section: Travail et Emploi), on April 12, 2012, gave the following answers: firms want to keep
their “good workers” regardless of the contract under which they were hired, but have diﬃculties
to lay oﬀ the workers under permanent contracts when they keep workers under temporary
contracts. This may either be due to a norm, the cost of breaking the implicit contract that
permanent workers should have a priority over workers under temporary contracts, or simply the
interpretation of the law by the labour administration (“inspecteurs du travail ”).
A simple transposition of this is to argue that the total cost of layoﬀs of permanent workers
is shifted up by the increasing number of temporary workers retained by the firm. In the context
of our model, the transposition of this is easy. In Section 3, we showed that the firm hires on
average a number NP of permanent and NT of temporary workers. Further, upon revelation
of uncertainty, the firm wishes to keep a fraction N
k
P
NP
of permanent workers and a fraction N
k
T
NT
of temporary workers, and layoﬀ a fraction N
f
P
NP
of their permanent workers and (not renew) a
fraction N
n
T
NT
of its temporary workers. In the logic of the argument presented above, it may
perfectly be the case that the cost of laying oﬀ permanent workers is not constant, but actually
a function of the permanent workers fired NfP and of the temporary workers kept in the firm N
k
T ,
denoted by Φ(NT,NfP ).
We are going to illustrate the logic of such a situation in a simplified setting. We assume that
the cost of laying oﬀ a single permanent worker is F = 0.03 if the firm does not hire temporary
workers; and that it increases to F = 0.05 if the firm does hire and retain a few temporary
workers.
This change in the structure of layoﬀ costs as a function of the hiring policy, and in particular,
of the hiring policy of temporary workers, is recognised ex-ante by the rational firm. To illustrate
the dilemma of the firm, we show in the next Figure the ex-ante expected profits of the firm as a
function of its hiring policy (blue line). As can be seen, in our calibration, with a slight decrease
of firing cost from 0.05 to 0.03, the profits of the firm are just as high (in this specific example)
with no temporary workers as with a share of temporary workers at the interior solution (0.45
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of temporary job oﬀers). The left maximum is instead a corner solution. This suggests that a
rationalisation of the proposal of the ANDRH is possible: firms may be indiﬀerent, depending
on parameters, between having no temporary contracts and having a large share of temporary
contracts. It may even be better oﬀ, depending again on parameters, if all temporary contracts
were eliminated.
The red line reflects the ex-ante well-being of workers (the average expected value of the wage
conditional on remaining in the firm, across contracts types and individual productivity): this
curve as a maximum for a low incidence of temporary contracts, and then it declines uniformly
as the share increases. This suggests that the proposal of the ANRDH could also be beneficial
to employees for this range of parameters. At this stage, we cannot conclude about this specific
last point. It is simply likely that such a reform would be easier to implement in larger firms.
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Figure 16: Optimal choice of temporary workers hired and firing costs as a function of temporary
workers hired.
6 Some long term aspects: productivity growth and the demand
for temporary contracts
The model developed so far also has an interpretation in terms of the economic cycle. Indeed, y
and its fluctuations have an impact on the demand for temporary contracts, with in particular
an inverted U-shape between mean productivity and the incidence of temporary contracts. A
higher value of productivity would first raise the relative demand for temporary contracts, and
54
then raise the relative demand for permanent contracts as the risk of hiring diminishes with
growth. We now extend the analysis.
6.1 Long-term productivity growth
We will show here that the second eﬀect dominates in a related setup with long-term productivity
growth. The analysis is based on Wasmer (1999). This is a continuous time model of balanced
growth. Labour productivity evolves at a growth rate g. There is an infinite number of atomistic
firms. Aggregate production Y is a function of the capital stock K and of eﬃcient units of labour
Negt: Y = F (K,NT egt + NP egt) where Ni the number of workers with contract i, with i = T
(temporary) or P (permanent).
The two types of contracts diﬀer in three ways: first, permanent contracts end up with a
smaller Poisson probability than temporary contracts sT > sP 33; second, permanent contracts
are associated with firing costs f ; third, coherently with the model of the previous section, implicit
heterogeneity leads to tougher selection of permanent workers, hence the cost of recruitment of
permanent workers γP is higher than the cost of recruitment of temporary workers γT . It is first
assumed that temporary contracts cannot be renewed, this assumption is relaxed in Wasmer
(1999, Section 5). We also relax this assumption in next sub-section.
Consistent with a balanced growth model, we assume the existence of a constant returns
to scale matching technology with two types of jobs, defined as follows: the total number of
contracts is the constant returns to scale function h(U, V ). Consistent with the model in Section
3, workers, ranking permanent jobs before temporary jobs, choose the first kind of job so that
there are hP = h(U, VP ) hires in permanent jobs, and hs = h(U, V )−h(U, Vl) hires in temporary
jobs.
The rest of the model involves wage bargaining over the surplus of the firm and the worker,
following Pissarides (1990); and we assume that the utility of leisure, wages and vacancy posting
costs all grow at rate g.
This model has the following properties.
1. The growth of this economy leads to the so-called “capitalisation eﬀect”: as hiring is an
investment leading to immediate costs and future profits, a higher level of productivity
growth aﬀects more the future benefits than it aﬀects the current hiring costs. Hence,
labour demands for both types of jobs potentially increases.
2. However, it increases faster for permanent jobs, since, by construction, those jobs have a
longer survival rate: the capitalisation eﬀect is stronger.
33One interpretation is that long-term contracts have no definite duration, in which case sP is an exogenous
reallocation rate due to technical change. Short-term contracts are defined-duration contracts, and are terminated
either by destruction with probability sshock, or due to reaching the maximum duration, which is (imperfectly)
proxied as another Poisson process with arrival rate smax; consequently ss = smax + sP .
55
3. As unemployed workers have more chances to get a permanent job when long-term growth
is higher, the threat point of employed workers in temporary jobs is improved. Hence, if
the absolute value of the demand for temporary workers increases with growth, the relative
demand decreases
4. There is a threshold level of growth gl such that: if g > gl, only permanent workers are
hired; if g < gl; both types coexist.
This latter result suggests that the need of temporary workers (useful to reduce hiring and
screening costs) is not constant: it depends both on economic conditions of the business cycle
and on long term factors. Above a threshold, temporary contracts would actually disappear in
the absence of any new regulation imposing a single contract. On the contrary, for low growth
rate values, the demand for temporary contracts would be so high that the transitional costs for
firms would become high or even prohibitive.
We now relax the assumption that temporary contracts cannot be transformed into permanent
contracts. Instead, we assume that a fraction of them can be upgraded into permanent contracts,
with Poisson intensity τ . This specification is consistent with several interpretations, but one
is consistent with the model of Section 3: workers with temporary contracts have not yet been
screened by firms consistent with the fact that the recruitment cost of temporary workers γT
is lower than the recruitment cost of permanent workersγP . The parameter τ can therefore be
interpreted as the arrival of a signal of the quality of the workers, subsequently leading to the
firm oﬀering a permanent contract to the worker.
6.2 Simulations
Using the Model mentioned above, we are able to simulate results for the unemployment rate
(u), the number of permanent employees (NP ), temporary employment (NT ) and the discounted
value of utility for a worker that is either unemployed , in a temporary job or in a permanent
job.
Results with two contracts (no transformation of temporary contracts)
Productivity growth (g) 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
u 0.122 0.120 0.118 0.117 0.115
NP 0.790 0.810 0.831 0.854 0.880
NT 0.0878 0.070 0.0507 0.0289 0.00438
Utility of unemployed 8.76 10.2 12.2 15.1 19.7
Utility of permanent workers 8.96 10.4 12.4 15.3 19.9
Utility of temporary workers 8.85 10.3 12.3 15.2 19.8
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The results show us that unemployment decreases with growth along with the proportion of
short term workers while the proportion of permanent or in this case ‘long term’ workers and
the overall expected utilities increase significantly. Aboveg = 0.0416, the demand for temporary
jobs disappears.
Results with 2 contracts and a transformation rate τ (g = 0)
Transformation rate τ 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1
u 0.122 0.111 0.102 0.0897 0.0730 0.0638
NP 0.790 0.760 0.759 0.780 0.837 0.880
NT 0.0878 0.129 0.139 0.131 0.0900 0.0560
Utility of the unemployed 8.76 8.97 9.17 10.1 9.21 9.51
Utility of permanent workers 8.96 9.18 9.42 10.6 9.27 9.61
Utility of temporary workers 8.85 9.05 9.24 9.99 9.37 9.64
A higher transformation rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases the welfare of
both permanent and temporary workers. Therefore, firm use temporary contracts to speed up
the hiring process (formally, firms create more vacancies because the hiring cost of temporary
workers is lower). If subsequently the contracts are transformed into permanent contracts, having
two forms of employment contracts can be beneficial for the economy.
6.3 Empirical test: the role of growth on the relative demand for temporary
contracts
We now proceed to some econometric analysis of the ideas developed so far. First, we will
investigate, in a panel of OECD countries34, the role of the diﬀerent components of employment
protection, running a regression like
Tempc,t = C+β1EPLREGc,t +β2EPLTEMPc,t +β3EPLREGc,t ×growthc,t+EPLTEMPc,t growthc,t+FEc+εi,c,t
(1)
Summary statistics of the variables are presented in table 4. Table 2 shows across diﬀerent
specifications that the restrictions on temporary contracts indeed generally reduce, as expected,
the incidence of temporary contracts, while employment protection for regular contracts raises
this demand. It is therefore essential to disentangle the two components, in line with the analysis
34Countries in the sample are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak, Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom
and United States. The period is from 1985 to 2008.
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in Cahuc et alii. (2011). As in Wasmer (1999), a higher growth rate tends to reduce the relative
demand for temporary contracts. However, this result is not as robust as the table suggests.
In Table 3 where the diﬀerent countries are actually weighted by their employment share in the
OECD, the signs of the components of EPL remain the same and significance too, but the eﬀect of
the growth rate of GDP is no longer significant. An interpretation is that, coherently with Section
3, GDP growth first increases the demand for temporary contracts (as firms are conservative)
and then, for higher values of growth, start raising permanent employment. Interaction terms
between growth and EPL do not show up very significantly. Theory would presumably suggest
either a positive or a negative sign.
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7 Concluding comments
Our starting point was the consensus of many economists in favour of a single contract. After a
review of the existing contracts in several OECD countries, and the discussion of the costs and
benefits of a single contract, we are however left with mixed feelings. The economic literature has
investigated and carefully documented many of the costs and benefits associated with employ-
ment protection: it favours some investments in specific skills but reduces labour turnover, raises
the misallocation of productive units, raises mismatch of workers, may raise stress on-the-job,
and finally leads to uncertainty in the termination of employment relations. But the jump to
a single contract does not logically follow, since it will not necessarily eliminate all the costs of
dualism. It further raises political economy questions, as compared to the alternative reforms
discussed in this text.
Further, the costs of dualism are far less well understood than the costs of EPL. The co-
existence of temporary and permanent contracts in itself certainly has some costs for workers.
However, they are certainly not as well documented and probably much less important than: a)
the costs of employment protection as such; b) the costs of removing one instrument (temporary
contracts) to firms, given that temporary contracts have some benefits for firms, as argued in
Barthélémy et alii. (2006). Section 5’s results show that suppressing temporary contracts has a
large negative employment eﬀect and requires an important reform of the regular contract to be
employment neutral. It is also shown that suppressing temporary contracts may have produc-
tivity enhancing eﬀects by easing the allocation of skills within the firm. We confirm the claim
by some firms and their representative that firing senior workers while keeping temporary ones is
costly in terms of morale or legal costs. In this case, our model shows under which conditions a
single contract could be beneficial. Section 5 also shows how temporary contracts can help firms
to hire workers even when expecting low future growth.
The political economy of the single labour contract is complex too. Advertising labour
market reforms using the “single labour contract” label is a way to insist on the convergence
between diﬀerent types of labour contracts and the removal of temporary contracts appears as
the least costly solution. The ‘single labour contract’ is meant to be a quid pro quo (an exchange
of something against something else, understood by the parties). By “single labour contract”,
proponents of this measure probably mean “ambitious reforms of permanent contracts” with less
protection, perhaps with compensation in other areas such as training rights. This may however
be a quiproquo (a real misunderstanding): if this amounts to the disappearance of temporary
contracts in exchange for an extended probation period, it is hard to believe that unions would
favour this solution since fixed duration contracts are fairly well protected as emphasised in
Cahuc et alii. (2012).35 Further, if the argument in Section 5 (the fact that firms may find it
35In that sense, the recent proposal made at the recent FRDB Conference (April 2012) to define an “Contrat
for Equal Opportunity” is a certainly a way to reduce the quiproquo.
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costly to layoﬀ permanent workers when they retain temporary workers) is certainly a new and
underestimated cost of dualism, it may be unlikely to convince unions either. A possibly more
sensible strategy for a reform limiting dualism consists on raising incentives to create permanent
contracts and reduce incentives to create temporary contracts. This has recently inspired the
round of negotiations between employers and unions in France (January 2013). The agreement
implements an additional taxation of short duration temporary contracts (less than three months)
if the temporary contract is not transformed into a permanent one, in exchange of a reform of
the procedure of collective layoﬀs.
A last remark is that the proponents of a single labour contract propose to introduce severance
payment increasing with seniority in the current job. It must be remembered however that such
seniority-based rights would also reduce incentives to professional mobility, as it is currently the
case in several European countries where job-to-job mobility is particularly low. It may be better
to favour severance payment increasing with seniority in the career, not in the current firm.
The conclusion of this report is therefore that in terms of political economy and the capacity
to drive an ambitious reform, the concept of flexicurity, with lower employment protection and
high unemployment benefits securing consumption and welfare, combined with incentives to
accept job oﬀers, and supplemented with active labour market policies and eﬃcient training, is
more adapted than the concept of a single labour contract.
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Appendix
A Data Appendix
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Portion of temp. empl. in new jobs 30.22% 15.97% 3.72% 78.24%
Growth rate 2.95% 2.28% -6.17% 10.92%
EPL of regular contracts 2.26 0.83 0.17 5.00
Restrictions to temp. contracts 2.24 1.52 0.25 5.38
Country Freq. Year Freq.
Australia 4 1986 10
Austria 14 1987 11
Belgium 23 1988 11
Canada 12 1989 11
Czech Republic 15 1990 11
Denmark 23 1991 12
Finland 12 1992 12
France 23 1993 12
Germany 15 1994 16
Greece 23 1995 18
Hungary 12 1996 18
Ireland 23 1997 23
Italy 23 1998 24
Japan 23 1999 24
Korea 5 2000 23
Mexico 11 2001 26
Netherlands 23 2002 24
Norway 13 2003 24
Poland 8 2004 26
Portugal 23 2005 25
Slovak Republic 15 2006 25
Spain 22 2007 24
Sweden 12 2008 24
Switzerland 11
Turkey 18
United Kingdom 23
United States 5
Total 434 434
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Figure 17: Temporary employment as percentage of all new jobs vs. two employment protection
dimensions
Figure 18: Temporary employment as percentage of all new jobs (average of all OECD countries)
Figure 19: Change in temporary employment as percentage of all new jobs and GDP growth
(average of all OECD countries)
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B OECD employment protection index
The three main components of individual protection index are:
1. The diﬃculty of dismissal: The conditions to be met for a dismissal to be considered as
“fair” considering the professional and personal situation of the employee.
2. The procedural burden of the dismissal for the employer: They include the legal possibilities
for the worker to challenge the decision and third party involvement in the process.
3. The notice and severance pay for no-fault dismissal: The mandatory notification period
before the end of the contract and the length of the pay after.
Almost all OECD countries introduced additional rules applicable to collective dismissals. The
most recent version of the index takes these rules into account. Finally, temporary contracts can
be viewed as a way to circumvent standard employment protection legislation. OECD countries
have also rules restraining the use of temporary employment to certain types of work and certain
durations, leading to a more eﬀective EPL in other dimensions. The final OECD EPL index
also measures the cost of these additional burdens on firms. The summary EPL indicator is
EPL = 5/12 ∗ EPLindividual + 5/12 ∗ EPLtemporary + 2/12 ∗ EPLcollective.
Table B.1: Total EPL indices in OECD countries
Country Mean EPL Country Mean EPL
United States 0,66 Belgium 2,50
New Zealand 1,04 Netherlands 2,52
United Kingdom 1,05 Slovak Republic 2,53
Canada 1,14 Norway 2,67
Ireland 1,25 Sweden 2,68
Australia 1,47 Germany 2,80
Switzerland 1,60 France 2,85
Hungary 1,61 Spain 3,04
Denmark 1,83 Turkey 3,36
Poland 1,92 Italy 3,38
Czech Republic 1,94 Greece 3,50
Finland 2,15 Portugal 3,66
Austria 2,39
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Figure B.1: Three dimensions of OECD EPL indicator
C CNE
An example: the case of the CNE in France
The New Employment Contract reform is a good example of how legal apparatuses can become
barriers to the implementation of new forms of contracts.
The New Employment Contract (CNE) reform (ordinance n°2005-893) was passed into law
on August 2005 after its ratification by the French Parliament. However, rapidly, the workers’
unions who believed it to be anti-constitutional contested the reform and seized the French
administrative high court (Conseil d’Etat) in order to have it repealed. The unions argued
that the CNE was contrary to convention 158 of the International Labour Organization (ILO).
International Treaties are considered to be superior in hierarchy to national laws in France (article
55 of the French Constitution) and since 1989 with the Nicolo judgement36, the French Conseil
d’Etat has been granted the power to annul a law that contradicts an international treaty.
On October 19th 2005, the Conseil d’Etat ruled in favour of the CNE, arguing that the
reform was not contrary to the convention 158 of the ILO. The Conseil d’Etat judged that
the period of employment consolidation could be compared to a period of ‘qualifying period of
employment’ (authorised in article 2 of the convention). It also stated that the two-year duration
of the trial period could be considered as ‘reasonable’ (respecting article 2 of the convention).
36CE, 20 Octobre 1989, Nicolo
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Finally, regarding the termination clauses of the CNE, the judges of the Conseil d’Etat rejected
the arguments given by the unions that the CNE could lead to abusive termination decisions.
They highlighted the fact that workers could contest termination in front of a national judge
who would determine whether or not the termination had been wrongful.
On April 28th 2006, despite the decision given by the Conseil d’Etat, the labour court of
Longjumeau (conseil des prud’hommes de Longjumeau) ruled that the CNE was contrary to
convention 158 and was therefore void. The Longjumeau decision was brought to the Paris Court
of Appeals. On July 6th 2007, the Paris court of Appeals ruled in favour of the Longjumeau
decision, against the CNE. The judges considered that the two-year duration of the probationary
period guaranteed by the ordinance could not be considered ‘reasonable’.
On November 14th 2007, the ILO published a report37 stating that the CNE was contrary
to convention 158. The ILO Committee felt that the policy considerations underlying the es-
tablishment of the CNE had little relevance to the situations covered by Article 2, paragraph 2,
and that the purpose of characterising the period of employment consolidation as a qualifying
period of employment was essentially to enable employees under the CNE to be excluded from
certain provisions of the Convention. Furthermore, the Committee was unable to conclude that
a consolidation period as long as two years was reasonable. Finally the Committee found that
the Ordinance n° 2005-893 significantly departed from the workers’ protections’ requirements of
article 4. This decision unlike the ones successively made by the Conseil d’Etat and the court
of Appeals was not legally binding as the ILO lacks coercive mechanisms. However, it increased
the likelihood for other French courts to rule against the CNE. Anticipating a negative ruling on
the CNE from a higher court, the French Parliament abrogated the 2005 ordinance on the CNE
by law (article 9 of law n°2008-596). All the CNE contracts were automatically reclassified as
traditional permanent contracts (CDI). Finally, on the 1st of July 2008, the Social Chamber of
the Cour de Cassation (High French court) confirmed the decisions made by the Paris court of
Appeals and rendered the CNE reform illegal.
D ANDRH
Extract Proposition 2: http://www.andrh.fr/content/download/39573/513020/file/propositions_2011.pdf
“En finir avec la précarité, grâce à l’instauration d’un contrat de travail unique, sans notion
de durée ni de motif : le CTU 2 L’instauration d’un contrat de travail unique (CTU) est une idée
qui fait son chemin depuis quelques années afin de lutter contre l’utilisation excessive des CDD
et de l’intérim, et simplifier l’application du code du travail. ‰ Le contrat de travail unique
s’énonce sans référence au temps; il est, par nature, à durée indéterminée et se substitue à tous
les CDI, CDD, contrats de missions, contrats saisonniers, actuellement en vigueur. ‰ Le salarié
37ILO, «Note on Convention n°158 and Recommendation n°166 » 2009,
<http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf>.
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est embauché pour une fonction ou un poste, et à un niveau de qualification et de rémunération
explicitement mentionnés. ‰ Les motifs de rupture du CTU sont : la faute du salarié, la rupture
d’un commun accord ou la fin de l’activité à laquelle ce salarié avait été aﬀecté. ‰ En deçà
de 2 ans d’ancienneté : • leur indemnité de licenciement est égale à 10% de l’ensemble des
rémunérations perçues au cours de la durée écoulée du contrat; • le préavis est proportionnel à
la durée du contrat écoulé; • l’entreprise aide le salarié licencié à la recherche d’emploi (aide à
la rédaction de CV, mises en relation); • les titulaires du CTU de moins de 18 mois ne relèvent
pas du périmètre d’un éventuel Plan de Sauvegarde de l’Emploi.”
E Technical Appendix I: model with constant aggregate produc-
tivity
E.1 Second period decision
E.1.1 Value functions
General values (using the ε subscript to show that G depends on ε)
Value of a permanent contract
VP (ε) = V0 + (1− qP )
￿ˆ y
w−F
(￿y − w) dGε (￿y)− FGε (w − F )￿
Value of a temporary contract
VT (ε) = V0 + (1− qT )
￿ˆ y
w
(￿y − w) dGε (￿y)− FGε (w)￿
Uniform distribution of ￿y
Gε (￿y) = ￿y − y (1− ε)
y − y (1− ε) = 1 +
￿y − y
εy
gε (￿y) = 1
εy
Values functions in case of uniform Permanent contract
VP (ε) = V0 + (1− qP )
￿
(y − w + F )2
2yε
− F
￿
Temporary contract
VT (ε) = V0 + (1− qT ) (y − w)
2
2yε
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Values functions in case of uniform G if all workers are kept Permanent contract
V lP (ε) = V0 + (1− qP )
￿
y − w − yε
2
￿
Note that V lP (ε) is strictly higher than V lT (ε) since there are no layoﬀs.
E.2 First period decision
E.2.1 Thresholds
Threshold εl to hiring permanent workers that will be kept with certainty: y (1− εl) = w − F
εl = 1− w − Fy
Threshold ε∗ to hiring permanent or temporary workers: VP (ε∗) = VT (ε∗)
ε∗ =
1
2yF
￿
(y − w + F )2 − 1− qT
1− qP (y − w)
2
￿
Threshold εh to hiring a temporary worker
VT (εh) = H
εh = (1− qT ) (y − w)
2
2y (H − V0)
E.2.2 Hired workers
(Assuming a uniform distribution of productivity with density 1εmax .
Attribution of permanent contracts
NP =
ε∗
εmax
Attribution of temporary contracts
NT =
εh − ε∗
εmax
Rejected applications
NR = 1− εhεmax
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Incidence of temporary workers
NT
NP +NT
=
εh−ε∗
εmax
ε∗
εmax
+ εh−ε∗εmax
= 1− ε
∗
εh
= 1− H
F
￿
1
1− qT
￿
1 +
F
y − w
￿2
− 1
1− qP
￿
E.3 Second period firing decisions
Probability of keeping workers as function of ε Probability of firing workers below εl
pl = 0
Probability of firing workers in permanent contracts (with ε > εl)
pP (ε) = Gε (w − F ) = 1− y − w + Fεy = 1−
εl
ε
Probability of firing workers in temporary contracts (with ε > εl)
pT (ε) = Gε (w) = 1− y − wεy
Fraction of hired workers kept in second period How many freshly hired workers are
kept after productivity is revealed?
Workers hired as permanent and kept as permanent:
NkP =
ˆ εl
0
(1− qP ) 1εmaxd￿ε+
ˆ ε∗
εl
(1− qP ) (1− pP (ε)) 1εmaxd￿ε
= (1− qP ) εlεmax [1 + ln (ε
∗)− ln (εl)]
Workers hired as permanent that quit:
N qP = qP IP = qP
ε∗
εmax
Workers hired as permanent and fired:
NfP =
ˆ ε∗
εl
(1− qP ) pP (ε) 1εmaxd￿ε
=
1− qP
εmax
(ε∗ − εl (1 + ln (ε∗)− ln (εl)))
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Workers hired as temporary and kept as temporary:
NkT =
ˆ εh
ε∗
(1− qT ) (1− pT (ε)) 1εmaxd￿ε
= (1− qT ) y − wyεmax (ln (εh)− ln (ε
∗))
Workers hired as temporary who quit
N qT = qTNT = qT
εh − ε∗
εmax
Workers hired as temporary and not renewed
NnT =
ˆ εh
ε∗
(1− qT ) pT (ε) 1εmaxd￿ε
=
(1− qT )
εmax
￿
ε∗ − εl − y − wy (ln (εh)− ln (ε
∗))
￿
Equilibrium stocks In an infinite period setting, stocks of workers of each productivity level
have to be stable in equilibrium.
Consider that each period, the exogenous stock of new recruits (of any ε) is R. The number
of new recruits of any specific ε is thus Rεmax . The stock of workers with productivity ε is S (ε).
The probability of shock to the productivity for any ε is qS .
If ε < εl, the equilibrium requires that
R
εmax
= Sl (ε) qP
Sl (ε) =
R
εmaxqP
If εl < ε < ε∗
SP (ε) =
R
εmax [qP + qSpP (ε)]
=
R
εmax
￿
qP + qS
￿
1− εlε
￿￿
(assuming that dt is short, we ignore the timing of firing/layoﬀ and drop cross terms).
If ε∗ < ε < εh
ST (ε) =
R
εmax [qT + qSpT (ε)]
=
R
εmax
￿
qT + qS
￿
1− y−wεy
￿￿
The stock of permanent workers is:
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SP =
ˆ εl
0
Sl (ε) dε+
ˆ ε∗
εl
SP (ε) dε
SP =
Rεl
εmax (qP + qS)
￿
qS
qP
+
ε∗
εl
+
qS
qP + qS
ln
￿
ε∗
εl
￿
1 +
qS
qP
￿
− qS
qP
￿￿
The stock of temporary workers
ST =
ˆ εh
ε∗
ST (ε) dε
ST =
R
εmax (qT + qS)
￿
(εh − ε∗) + θ ln
￿
εh − θ
ε∗ − θ
￿￿
where θ =
1−wy
1+
qT
qS
.
Welfare analysis Firm
ΠF =
ˆ εl
0
V lP (ε) dF (ε) +
ˆ ε∗
εl
VP (ε) dF (ε) +
ˆ εh
ε∗
VT (ε) dF (ε)
ΠF =
1
εmax
 (1− qP )
￿
εl (y − w)− y2ε2l
+ (y−w+F )
2
2y
￿
ln
￿
ε∗
εl
￿￿
− F (ε∗ − εl)
￿
+(1− qT ) (y−w)
2
2y
￿
ln
￿ εh
ε∗
￿￿
+ εhV0

Workers:
ΠW =
￿
NkP +N
k
T
￿
w
=
￿
(1− qP ) εl
￿
1 + ln
￿
ε∗
εl
￿￿
+ (1− qT ) y − wy ln
￿εh
ε∗
￿￿ w
εmax
Total welfare
Ω = ΠF +ΠW =
1
εmax
 (1− qP )
￿
εly − y2ε2l + (y+F )
2−w2
2y ln
￿
ε∗
εl
￿
− F (ε∗ − εl)
￿
+(1− qT ) ln
￿ εh
ε∗
￿ y2−w2
y2 + εhV0

F Technical Appendix II: random aggregate productivity
Now, the productivity of period 2 is uncertain. There is a probability pm of adverse shock, giving
an aggregate productivity of y−.
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F.1 Value functions
Uniform distribution of ￿y
Gε,y (￿y) = 1 + ￿y − y
εy
; Gε,y− (￿y) = 1 + ￿y − y−εy−
gε,y (￿y) = 1
εy
; gε,y− (￿y) = 1εy−
F.2 Values functions in case of uniform
Permanent contract
VP (ε) = (1− qP )
￿
(1− pm) (y − w + F )
2
2yε
+ pm
(y− − w + F )2
2y−ε
− F
￿
Temporary contract
VT (ε) = (1− qT )
￿
(1− pm) (y − w)
2
2yε
+ pm
(y− − w)2
2y−ε
￿
Values functions in case of uniform G if all workers are kept Permanent contract
VP (ε) = (1− qP )
￿
2− ε
2
￿
(1− pm) y + pmy−
￿− w￿
Note that VP (ε) is strictly higher than VT (ε) since there are no layoﬀs.
F.3 First period decision
F.3.1 Thresholds
Threshold εl to hiring permanent workers that will be kept with certainty:
pmy (1− εl) + (1− pm) y− (1− εl) = w − F
εl = 1− w − Fpmy + (1− pm) y−
Threshold ε∗ to hiring permanent or temporary workers
VP (ε
∗) = VT (ε∗)
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ε∗ =
1
2F
 (1− pm) (y−w+F )2y + pm (y
−−w+F)2
y−
− (1−qT )(1−qP )
￿
(1− pm) (y−w)
2
y + pm
(y−−w)2
y−
￿ 
Threshold εh to hiring a temporary worker
VT (εh) = H
εh =
(1− qT )
2H
￿
(1− pm) (y − w)
2
y
+ pm
(y− − w)2
y−
￿
F.3.2 Ratio of hired workers
Assuming a distribution of productivities K (ε) = εεmax , k (ε) =
1
εmax
.
Attribution of permanent contracts
NP = K (ε
∗) =
ε∗
εmax
Attribution of temporary contracts
NT = K (εh)−K (ε∗) = εh − ε
∗
εmax
Rejected applications
NR = 1−K (εh) = 1− εhεmax
Incidence of temporary contracts
NT
NT +NP
=
εh−ε∗
εmax
εh−ε∗
εmax
+ ε
∗
εmax
= 1− ε
∗
εh
= 1 +
H
F
 1
1− qP −
1
1− qT
(1− pm) (y−w+F )
2
y + pm
(y−−w+F)2
y−
(1− pm) (y−w)
2
y + pm
(y−−w)2
y−

F.3.3 Second period firing decisions
Probability of keeping workers as function of ε and y Probability of firing workers below
εl
78
pl = 0
Probability of firing workers in permanent contracts (with ε > εl)
pP (ε, y) = Gε,y (w − F ) = 1− y − w + Fεy ; pP
￿
ε, y−
￿
= 1− y
− − w + F
εy−
Probability of firing workers in temporary contracts (with ε > εl)
pT (ε, y) = Gε,y (w) = 1− y − wεy ; pT
￿
ε, y−
￿
= 1− y
− − w
εy−
Fraction of hired workers kept in second period Workers hired as permanent and kept
as permanent:
NkP (y) =
1− qP
εmax
￿
εl +
y − w + F
y
(ln (ε∗)− ln (εl))
￿
NkP
￿
y−
￿
=
1− qP
εmax
￿
εl +
y− − w + F
y−
(ln (ε∗)− ln (εl))
￿
Workers hired as permanent that quit:
N qP = qPNP = qP
ε∗
εmax
Workers hired as permanent and fired:
NfP (y) = NP −NfP −NkP (y)
=
1− qP
εmax
￿
ε∗ − εl − y − w + Fy (ln (ε
∗)− ln (εl))
￿
NfP
￿
y−
￿
=
1− qP
εmax
￿
ε∗ − εl − y
− − w + F
y−
(ln (ε∗)− ln (εl))
￿
Workers hired as temporary and kept as temporary:
NkT (y) = (1− qT )
y − w
yεmax
(ln (εh)− ln (ε∗))
NkT
￿
y−
￿
= (1− qT ) y − wyεmax (ln (εh)− ln (ε
∗))
Workers hired as temporary who quit
79
N qT = qTNT = qT
εh − ε∗
εmax
Workers hired as temporary and not renewed
NnT = IT − IqT − IkT (y)
NnT =
1− qT
εmax
￿
εh − ε∗ − y − wy (ln (εh)− ln (ε
∗))
￿
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